Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 45
Number 2 Winter 2011

pp.505-549

Winter 2011

Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and
ICANN's Lifting of Domain Name Restrictions
Brian W. Borchert

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brian W. Borchert, Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and ICANN's Lifting of Domain
Name Restrictions, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 505 (2011).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/3

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Borchert: Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and ICANN's Lif

Notes
IMMINENT DOMAIN NAME: THE
TECHNOLOGICAL LAND-GRAB AND
ICANN’S LIFTING OF DOMAIN NAME
RESTRICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
We learn from history that we learn nothing from history.1
On May 20, 1862, the United States Congress passed the Homestead
Act, which prompted American citizens to settle and claim lands
throughout the western frontier.2 Following an application process, this
legalized land-grab allotted 160 acres of land for homesteaders to live on,
improve, and cultivate crops.3 The United States Congress created this
Act to encourage settling and cultivation of the previously uninhabited
western territories.4 Unfortunately, fraud plagued this new policy.5
Land speculators and corporations often hired phony claimants to claim
lands that were abundant in natural resources such as timber, coal, and
oil.6 It is estimated that between 1852 and 1904, the General Land Office
granted 500 million acres through the Homestead Act, though

1
KEVIN GOLDSTEIN-JACKSON, THE DICTIONARY OF ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS 72 (1983)
(quoting George Bernard Shaw, an Irish playwright, critic, and political activist (1856–
1950)).
2
Homestead Acts, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (expired 1976); DENNIS W. JOHNSON, THE LAWS
THAT SHAPED AMERICA 91 (2009) (noting that President Lincoln signed the legislation on
May 20, 1862).
3
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 90 (describing that homesteaders would receive either 160
acres valued at $1.25 per acre, or 80 acres at $2.50 per acre).
4
See id. at 79 (explaining that homesteading lands were given to settlers who could not
normally afford them in exchange for their hard work to improve and settle the western
lands).
5
Lee Ann Potter & Wynell Schamel, The Homestead Act of 1862, THE NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/homestead-act/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2010)
(demonstrating that the misconduct included land speculators taking advantage of the
legislative loophole that failed to specify if the 12x14 dwelling was to be in feet or inches,
and that the underfunded Land Office had underpaid and overworked agents who were
open to bribery).
6
Kathy Weiser, The Homestead Act—Creating Prosperity in America, LEGENDS OF AM.,
http://www.legendsofamerica.com/AH-Homestead.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010)
(noting that the phony claimants alleged they made “improvements” to the land when in
reality all they did was sell their land to the highest bidder).
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approximately only 80 million acres actually went to homesteaders.7 A
number of subsequent homesteading laws attempted to fix the initial
failure, but most of the available western territory had already been
distributed.8
Evidently, history has an interesting way of repeating itself. Some of
the same issues that beleaguered the Homestead Act over 150 years ago
are now playing out in the technological land-grab occurring on the
Internet. The registration of domain names in the twenty-first century
represents the new technological land-grab. The Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), the governing body of
the Internet, plays the role of the United States Congress in 1852. The
Homestead Act of today happens to be the lifting of restrictions on who
can register domain names and what names can be registered. This new
expansion of domain name registrations has insufficient legal backing,
and as a result, fraud by way of cybersquatting is likely to occur.9
This Note reviews the issue of abusive domain name registration in
relation to ICANN’s lifting of registration restrictions. Part II explores
background material such as the formation of the Internet and the
domain name system as it exists today.10 Later, it covers the numerous
forms of domain name abuses and the varied public and private
remedies created to combat domain name registration abuse.11 In Part
III, the public and private remedies are assessed and critiqued.12
Following that analysis, Part IV suggests an ideal and previously
unarticulated approach to accommodate ICANN’s new expansion policy
in regard to domain name registration.13 For a complete understanding
of this issue, it is best to review the background of the Internet and the
domain name system.

7
Homestead Act (1862), OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?
flash=old&doc=31 (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (“Of some 500 million acres dispersed by the
General Land Office between 1862 and 1904, only 80 million acres went to homesteaders.”).
8
Weiser, supra note 6 (detailing that the Homesteading Act of 1912 and Taylor Grazing
Act of 1934 attempted to reconcile the shortcomings of the 1852 Act but most of the land
had already been allocated).
9
See infra II.D (discussing the problematic expansion of domain name registrations).
10
See infra Part II.A–C (covering the Internet and the domain name system’s formation
and governance).
11
See infra Part II.E–F (detailing domain name registration abuses and the current
remedies available).
12
See infra Part III (analyzing the successes and failures of the current remedial
measures).
13
See infra Part IV (suggesting various solutions to current domain name registration
issues).
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II. BACKGROUND
Part II.A explores the Internet’s foundation and its basic structure.14
Then, Part II.B progresses to the formation, history, and functioning of
the domain name system.15 After covering how the domain name
system works, Part II.C explores how the domain name system is
governed and maintained.16 Following an explanation of Internet
administration, Part II.D discusses and explains typical domain name
registration disputes.17 Following the full explanation of domain name
registration disputes, Part II.E delves into a more specific analysis and
breakdown of the most prevalent domain name disputes.18 Finally, Part
II.F highlights the major remedial measures in place to adjudicate
current domain name disputes.19
A. Internet Fundamentals
The Internet began as an experimental government research
project.20 In the Internet’s infancy—as a far less complex form—the
United States government maintained control of its operation.21 Within a
short period of time, the functionality and utility of the Internet began to
expand.22 By the mid-1980s, scientists linked computers all over the
world into a “network of networks.”23

See infra Part II.A (discussing the Internet’s formation and initial structure).
See infra Part II.B (covering the history and development of the domain name system).
16
See infra Part II.C (reviewing the Internet’s governance and administration).
17
See infra Part II.D (explaining the potential problems of the introduction of new
generic top-level domains).
18
See infra Part II.E (specifically addressing the most problematic domain name
disputes).
19
See infra Part II.F (addressing the legislative measures to combat domain name
disputes).
20
See Peter T. Holsen, ICANN’T Do It Alone: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers and Content-Based Problems on the Internet, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 147,
149 (2002) (“In 1965, scientists developed a way for a computer in Massachusetts to
communicate with a second computer in California. The U.S. Department of Defense
deemed this technology to have great potential and funded research projects to further its
development.”).
21
Reece Roman, Note, What if ICANN Can’t?: Can the United Nations Really Save the
Internet?, 15 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 27, 2 (Spring 2007), available at
http://justice.syr.edu/sstlr/wp-content/uploads/what-if-icann-cant_can-the-unitednations-really-save-the-internet.pdf (describing that initially the U.S. Government oversaw
the Internet with the help of a number of research institutions).
22
Holsen, supra note 20, at 149 (explaining that many universities and governmental
agencies maintained private computer networks that transferred data and email messages).
23
Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 193 (Oct.
2000).
14
15
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The contemporary Internet is an even more elaborate and
complicated system of networks.24 Each individual computer connected
on the Internet is assigned a unique identifying code known as an
Internet Protocol (“IP”) address.25 As the Internet became more
commercialized, the long string of numbers in an IP address became
increasingly cumbersome to the average Internet consumer, necessitating
a more workable system.26 To solve this problem, domain names
replaced IP addresses as a more navigable tool for using the Internet.27
The Internet has grown exponentially since the time that domain names
became the standard.28 Accordingly, commercial industries and retailers
24
See Kevin A. Meehan, Note, The Continuing Conundrum of International Internet
Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 349 (2008) (explaining that the geography of
the Internet “is not . . . easily charted”); ICANN DNS Stability: The Effect of New Generic Top
Level Domains on the Internet Domain Name System, ICANN, 1 (Feb. 6, 2008),
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/dns-stability-draft-paper-06feb08.pdf
[hereinafter
ICANN DNS Stability] (stating that the Internet’s structure “consists of a backbone of
networks and servers connected” with one another that allow for the sharing of
information). These information sharing technologies include Internet Protocol (“IP”)
addresses and domain names and fall under the Internet’s Domain Name System (“DNS”).
Id.
25
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 650 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (describing that the IP gives each computer a unique numerical address on the
Internet that consists of four groups of numbers separated by periods).
26
See Amanda Rohrer, UDRP Arbitration Decisions Overridden: How Sallen Undermines
the System, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 563, 566 (2003) (noting that the long string of
numbers in IP addresses are difficult to remember).
27
See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 37–38 (2000). Froomkin explains that in their
most simplistic form
[d]omain names are the alphanumeric text strings to the right of an
“@” in an e-mail address, or immediately following the two slashes in
a World Wide Web address. By practice and convention, domain
names can be mapped to a thirty-two-bit number consisting of four
octets (sets of eight binary digits) that specifies a network address and
a host ID on a TCP/IP network. These are the “Internet protocol”
(IP—not to be confused with “intellectual property”) numbers—the
numbers that play a critical role in addressing all communications over
the Internet, including e-mail and World Wide Web traffic. They have
justly been called the “human-friendly address of a computer.”
Id.; see also Nilanjana Chatterjee, Arbitration Proceedings Under ICANN’s Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy - Myth or Reality, 10 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 67,
71 (2006) (clarifying that an Internet domain name is the equivalent to a phone number or
street address); Ian J. Block, Comment, Hidden Whois and Infringing Domain Names: Making
the Case for Registrar Liability, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 431, 433 (describing that domain names
identify Internet websites for the ease of user web navigation).
28
See Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.
com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (according to statistics as recent as June 30, 2009,
there were over 1.6 billion internet users across the globe with an astounding 362.3% user
growth from 2000 to 2009); see also Domain Counts & Internet Statistics, DOMAIN TOOLS,
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have flocked to this new medium to reach consumers and bolster sales.29
This increase in Internet usage, and commerce conducted therein, also
exposed problems.30 For a complete understanding of these issues,
further explanation of how the Internet Domain Name system functions
is necessary.
B. The Domain Name System (“DNS”)
Contrary to popular belief, the Internet DNS does not consist of one
single file but rather is a complex, leveled system similar to a pyramid.31
At the apex of the DNS pyramid is the root zone.32 The root zone
consists of the general category of top-level domains (“TLDs”).33 Three
http://www.domaintools.com/internet-statistics/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (calculating
that as of October 6, 2009, there were 111,971,495 currently active and registered domain
names in the world).
29
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743 (June 10,
1998) (“From its origins as a U.S.-based research vehicle, the Internet is rapidly becoming
an international medium for commerce, education and communication.”); see also Kiran
Nasir Gore, Comment, Trademark Battles in a Barbie-Cyber World: Trademark Protection of
Website Domain Names and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 31 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 193, 200 (2009) (summarizing that in the late 1990s the Internet became
an avenue for businesses to better reach consumers); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS (May
28, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2007/2007reportfinal.pdf. The
most recent U.S. Census Bureau statistics show that U.S. retail online commerce reached
almost $127 billion in 2007, up from $107 billion in 2006. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, at 1.
Further, from 2002 to 2007 online retail sales grew at an annual rate of 23.1%, compared to
a meager 5% for total retail sales. Id. at 3.
30
See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (relating
that the number of disputes over domain names have increased with the growing
commercialization of the Internet); Kenneth S. Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in
Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 483 (1996)
(“The phenomenal growth of the Internet as a commercial medium has brought about a
new set of concerns in the realm of intellectual property.”); David S. Magier, Note, Tick,
Tock, Time is Running Out to Nab Cybersquatters:
The Dwindling Utility of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 46 IDEA 415, 417 (2006). The author notes that
“[b]ecause of the borderless, ubiquitous, and often anonymous nature of cyberspace, the
increase in e-commerce brings to the fore significant jurisdictional challenges for those
seeking to protect their intellectual property.” Id.
31
See Globosantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 618 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(explaining that the DNS is not a single master file in a single location but instead a
hierarchical system with each “name server” providing information for its “zone”).
32
See ICANN DNS Stability, supra note 24, at 1 (outlining that the root zone which
contains information regarding TLDs is found at the top of the DNS pyramid).
33
See, e.g., Am. Girl, L.L.C. v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(detailing the overall structure of top-level domains); see also Solid Host, N.L. v.
Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d. 1092, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“A domain name is
composed of two parts, separated by a period. The portion to the right of the period, i.e.,
the ‘com’ in <google.com>, is known as the ‘top level domain’ or ‘TLD.’”); Smith v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (“An SLD [second-
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different types of TLDs encompass all of the existing TLDs.34 The most
common type is the generic top-level domain name (known as a
“gTLD”), which includes the .com, .org, and .net extensions and are not
associated with any specific region or country.35 In the 1980s, seven
gTLDs were created.36 Additional debates among the world Internet
community led to the introduction of numerous more gTLDs within the
last decade.37 Currently, the comprehensive list of all the three types of
authorized TLDs, known as the root domain’s authoritative list, contains
265 official TLDs.38 Numerically, the largest of the 265 TLDs in the DNS
by far is the .com gTLD.39
Beyond the technical aspects of the DNS, the overall system is
maintained by two groups: the registry and the registrars.40 According
level domain] name is a string of numbers and/or letters immediately to the left of the dot
in the address . . . . For instance, in the domain name ‘example.com,’ ‘.com’ is the TLD and
‘example’ is the SLD name.”). See generally Roman, supra note 21, at 8 (“TLDs provide a
mechanism for name servers to recognize websites requested by Internet users.”).
34
See Roman, supra note 21, at 7–8. The other two types of TLDs include the country
specific (known as ccTLD), for example, .uk (United Kingdom), .ch (Switzerland), .au
(Australia), or .jp (Japan). Id. The third type is used solely for infrastructure purposes and
is not important to the average Internet user. Id.
35
See id. (noting that country specific top-level domains are known as ccTLDs).
36
See Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/tlds (last visited
Dec. 23, 2010) (noting that the following top-level domains were created in the 1980s; .com,
.edu, .gov, .int, .mil, .net, and .org).
37
See id. (illustrating that within the last decade a number of other top-level domains
such as .biz, .info, .name, .pro, .aero, .coop, and .museum have been unveiled).
38
See Scott P. Sonbuchner, Note, Master of Your Domain: Should the U.S. Government
Maintain Control over the Internet’s Root?, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 183, 186–87 (2008); see also New
gTLDs—Frequently Asked Questions, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/topics/newgtlds/strategy-faq.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter ICANN FAQs] (stating
twenty-one gTLDs currently exist).
39
See Dennis Carlton, Report of Dennis Carlton Regarding ICANN’s Proposed Mechanism for
Introducing New gTLDs, ICANN, 5 (June 5, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/newgtlds/carlton-re-proposed-mechanism-05jun09-en.pdf (highlighting that more than 80
million .com TLDs exist while only 12 million and 7 million .net and .org TLDs exist,
respectively); see also ICANN Registry Operator Monthly Reports January 2009, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/monthly-reports/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). A review of
all the ICANN Accredited Registrars demonstrates that .com is the most commonly
accredited TLD.
ICANN-Accredited Registrars, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/
registrars/accredited-list.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); see also Donna L. Howard, Note,
Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet Domain Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 637, 639–40 (2001) (stating that the .com top-level domain name is the most
commonly used by commercial entities and generally seen as a catchall top-level domain);
C. Kim Le, Comment, Genericness Need Not Apply: Employing Generic Domain Names in
Cyberspace, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1093, 1095 (2004) (noting that
approximately ninety-eight percent of all words found in Webster’s English Dictionary are
currently registered as domain names).
40
See Globosantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 619 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Registrars deal directly with individual domain name registrants in a retail domain name
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to the most recent statistics, there are currently 943 accredited domain
name registrars and twenty official registries.41 For an average Internet
user, registering a domain name is a relatively streamlined and efficient
process.42 Once a registrar has received a domain name registration
request, its obligations are minimal, which in turn results in some of the
Internet’s common governance and administrative issues.43

selling capacity. Id. The registry, in turn, operates in a more limited capacity by mainly
maintaining and organizing the Registry Database. Id. That database consists of all the
domain names registered by all registrants and registrars in each top-level domain. Id.; see
also Solid Host, N.L. v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d. 1092, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The
registry maintains a centralized, publicly accessible database of information concerning all
domain names in a TLD, known as the WHOIS (or Whois) database; this database is
compiled from information submitted by registrars.”).
41
See generally ICANN-Accredited Registrars, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/
registrars/accredited-list.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (indicating that there were 943
accredited registrars, 54.6% of which were located in the United States as of September 30,
2009); Registry Listing, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/registries/listing.html (last
visited Dec. 23, 2010) (noting that there are currently twenty official registries).
42
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 415–16 (2d Cir. 2004). The
registration process occurs
[w]hen an individual or an organization desires to register a domain
name, it may do so through any accredited registrar . . . . The
applicant first chooses one of the TLDs offered by the registrar and
then creates an accompanying SLD name, thereby fashioning a
potential domain name, which is then submitted electronically to the
registrar for approval. However, no two SLD names within a given TLD
can be identical. Accordingly, if someone submits an application for a
particular domain name that already exists in the Registry WHOIS
database by virtue of a prior registration, that name cannot be
registered again, and the applicant is advised that the sought domain
name is unavailable. The applicant may then choose to submit an
application for an alternate domain name, either by changing or
adding or subtracting a letter(s) or number(s) or a dash(es) to his
initially submitted SLD name within the same TLD, or by going to
another TLD where the initially submitted SLD name is still available.
If there is no existing registration for a given SLD name within a given
TLD, that domain name is considered available and generally may be
registered on a first-come, first served basis.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161−62 (N.D. Ala.
2001). The court also determined that, at a minimum, applicants must supply their name,
postal address, telephone number, and an e-mail address. See id. at 395.
43
See Howard, supra note 39, at 640 (explaining that in the domain name registration
process the registrar audits to make sure the same name is not already registered). If it is
not, then the registration is approved. Id. During the application process, the applicant
must assure that its use of the domain name does not violate a third party’s rightful
ownership and also that any use of the domain name will not be for unlawful activity. Id.
The registrar itself does not conduct its own investigation into the applicant. Id.
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C. Domain Name Governance and Administration
Following the adoption of a federal policy favoring competitive
domain name registration, the Clinton administration issued two plans
that formed a private non-profit corporation responsible for governing
the DNS.44 As part of those plans, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers stepped in to govern the complex DNS.45 From its
inception, ICANN had specific strategic objectives in mind regarding the
governance of the DNS.46 The federal government surrendered the DNS

44
Solid Host, N.L., 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (“In 1998, the federal government adopted a
policy favoring competitive domain name registration. ‘In furtherance of this policy, a
private, non-profit corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (‘ICANN’), was formed to assume responsibilities for managing the allocation of
Internet Protocol numbers and the domain name system.’”) (citations omitted). The
Clinton administration addressed these concerns by “issuing a White Paper titled
Management of Internet Names and Addresses. The White Paper recognized a ‘need for
change’ regarding the Internet’s administration. . . . [and] called on the Internet community
to create an administrative body ‘based on a broad consensus among industry
stakeholders,’ that would be free from government control.” Roman, supra note 21, at 6
(parenthetical omitted) (citing and quoting Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed. Reg. 31, 741 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper], available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm)); see also Howard,
supra note 39, at 655 (“[The Clinton administration] issued two plans, the ‘White Paper’ and
‘Green Paper,’ that ‘would confer upon this non-profit corporation much responsibility in
the domain naming system,’ granting ICANN ‘leeway in how it carried out its functions’
and allowing ICANN ‘to set forth certain standards.’”) (quoting Adam Silberlight,
Comment, WWW.How to Be a Master of Your Domain.com: A Look at the Assignment of Internet
Domain Names Under Federal Trademark Laws, Federal Case Law and Beyond, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 229, 270–71 (2000)).
45
See Roman, supra note 21 (“In response to these criticisms the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) emerged as the recognized authority charged
with DNS governance.”); see also Rod Beckstrom, Message from the CEO, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/ceo/ceo-message-21jul09-en.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010)
(“[ICANN’s] original 1998 memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Government
stated one of [ICANN’s] key responsibilities this way: ‘Oversight of the policy for
determining the circumstances under which new top level domains would be added to the
root system.’”). See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010)
(documenting the agreement between the Department of Commerce and ICANN).
46
See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.
Tex. 2001). ICANN stated that it
has four mandates . . . .
First, ICANN bears responsibility for
overseeing the infrastructure of the Internet. Second, it bears
responsibility for ensuring competition among domain name registrars
of the TLDs.
Third, ICANN bears partial responsibility for
establishing domain name dispute resolution policies. And, fourth,
ICANN bears responsibility for determining whether and when to add
new TLDs.
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governance power to ICANN because a private governing organization
had certain advantages.47 Nonetheless, the federal government was not
willing to allow ICANN to have complete autonomy.48 ICANN,
however, used its delineated powers to create a more regimented system
for its registries and registrars.49 This system operated rather smoothly
for nearly eleven years and only recently had some substantial
complications.50

Id.; see also ICANN Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, ICANN (as revised Nov. 21, 1998), http://www.icann.org/en/general/
articles.htm . The Articles state ICANN
shall . . . pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the
burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the
operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating the assignment
of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal
connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions
related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address
space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the
coordination of the Internet domain name system (“DNS”), including
the development of policies for determining the circumstances under
which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv)
overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server
system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in
furtherance of items (i) through (iv).
Id.
47
See Roman, supra note 21, at 6 (explaining that a nongovernmental organization was
more favorable to govern the Internet because private entities are more flexible,
specialized, and capable of quick action); see also White Paper, supra note 44 (stating that
private administration of the Internet would better effectuate the goals of Internet stability,
competition, private coordination, and representation of the whole Internet community).
48
See Sonbuchner, supra note 38, at 192 (explaining that the U.S. Government willingly
handed over the control of the Internet’s infrastructure but maintained oversight of
ICANN); see also Kim G. von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen, A Declaration of Independence of
ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 17 (Fall 2002), available at
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v9i1/Article4.html#_ednref1 (“[The Department of Commerce]
controls ICANN through a contractual framework underpinned by the DoC control of the
A root domain server.”); Roman, supra note 21 (pointing out that ICANN derives its
authority from a series of contracts with the Department of Commerce).
49
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 415 (2d Cir. 2004) (“ICANN policies
regarding domain name registrations ‘are mainly implemented through ICANN’s entry of
agreements with domain-name registries and registrars.’”) (quoting Second Status Report
Under ICANN/US Government Memorandum of Understanding, ICANN (June 30, 2008),
http://www.icann.org/general/statusreport-30jun00.htm); see also Sonbuchner, supra note
38, at 194 (“ICANN’s solution was a mandatory registrar accreditation system: all
registrars would have to meet ICANN specified qualifications before they could sell
domain names to the public.”). See generally Registrar Accreditation: Overview, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation-overview.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010)
(summarizing the role of registrars).
50
See ICANN, 2008 Annual Report, iv (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.icann.org/en/
annualreport/annual-report-2008-en.pdf. Since ICANN’s inception
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D. Introduction of New gTLDs as a Potential Problem
Recently, ICANN ratified a groundbreaking new policy that would
allow it to accept registrations for new gTLDs from private entities.51
ICANN determined that such an expansion was mandatory for the
continued technological advancement and innovation of the Internet.52
we have witnessed tremendous growth in the ICANN community
with more government engagement through the Government
Advisory Committee, an increased multi-stakeholder participation and
an enhanced bottom-up process. Despite all of the changes and
challenges that the Internet has faced, ICANN has made remarkable
evolution in its structure and has continued to grow towards a truly
global and stable organization, operating in an open and transparent
manner.
Id.
Christine Haight Farley, Convergence and Incongruence: Trademark Law and ICANN’s
Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 625,
626 (2009). This policy is seen as radical because
it is not meant to just provide a handful of new gTLDs. Nor is it meant
to provide a set [sic] a period for applications or specific ideas about
what areas these new gTLDs will designate. Instead, what ICANN is
considering is a uniform system to approve generic top level domains
that is expected to have profound implications. ICANN expects to
approve hundreds of new gTLDs annually in the future.
Id.; see, e.g., Danny Younger, Languages in the Root: A TLD Launch Strategy Based on ISO 639,
CIRCLEID (Oct. 5, 2004 8:23 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/languages_in_the_
root_a_tld_launch_strategy_based_on_iso_639 (claiming that over 400 language-affiliated
TLDs alone are currently being proposed); see also Reinhardt Krause, Name Game Challenges
ICANN’s New Chief, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Nov. 27, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23859645
(noting that the new policy has vast global, political, and financial implications). In an
interview, ICANN CEO Rod Beckstrom reasoned that the expansion was necessary to
“increase competition in the domain name market.” Id.; see also ICANN, Draft Applicant
Guidebook, v3, 2-1 (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfpclean-04oct09-en.pdf (detailing that all new gTLD applicants will undergo an initial
evaluation and those who do not pass all necessary elements will be subject to further
evaluation).
52
See Carlton, supra note 39, at 13. ICANN determined the following:
An increase in the number of gTLDs increases the number of
alternatives available to customers, and thus offers the potential for
increased competition, reduced prices, and increased output. The
availability of new gTLDs also offers increased opportunities for
registries and registrars to develop innovative services or business
models that could provide significant opportunities for increases in
consumer welfare.
....
A variety of innovations are likely to be facilitated by expansion
of the number of gTLDs. For example: A gTLD dedicated to serving
the financial services industry might require registrants to provide
secure transactions. The certification provided in the gTLD name thus
provides valuable information to consumers who desire secure
financial transactions over the Internet.
51
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Many private organizations and entities have expressed interest in
establishing their own gTLD under this new policy.53 However, many
organizations and scholars have also criticized the proposed plan,
mainly because of the expansion’s uncertain future and also potential
intellectual property problems that may arise as a result of the
expansion.54 Specifically, many U.S. businesses recognize that such a
Wild West-like expansion to domain name registration could potentially
create legal problems related to trademark protection, consumer fraud,
and cybersquatting.55 To date, ICANN does not have a policy in place to
Id. at 6, 13 (bulleted format omitted); see also Beckstrom, supra note 45. Beckstrom states the
following:
The Internet has historically thrived whenever the system is opened up
further to allow users to express their creativity and innovation. We
are now working on opening up the top-level domains so that not only
nations but also other peoples and groups can have a unique identity
on the Internet.
....
The original limitations on domain names had to do with the limited
capabilities of computers and networks in decades gone by. Given
today’s advances in power, bandwidth and memory, the time has
clearly come to open up the myriad possibilities in Internet naming.
Id.; see New gTLD Program Explanatory Memorandum, ICANN, 1 (May 30, 2009),
https://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/three-character-30may09-en.pdf. With this
new policy
expansion will allow for more innovation, choice and change to the
Internet’s addressing system, now constrained by only 21 generic toplevel domain names. In a world with 1.5 billion Internet users—and
growing—diversity, choice and competition are key to the continued
success and reach of the global network.
Id. See generally Mike Sachoff, ICANN Approves Expansion of Domain Names, WEBPRONEWS
(June 26, 2008), http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/06/26/icann-approvesexpansion-of-domain-names (“New generic Top Level Domains . . . will open up the
Internet and make it look as diverse as the people who use it.”).
53
See Beckstrom, supra note 45. Beckstrom shared that His Majesty King Goodwill
Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, the chief of the Zulu tribe, sent ICANN a letter declaring his
interest to register the dot-zulu domain name. Id. His Majesty wrote that the dot-Zulu
domain name could link the entire world Zulu community. Id. Beckstrom added that New
York City and the city of Berlin have also inquired into registering their own domain
names. Id.; see also Mike Rodenbaugh, Abusive Domain Registrations: ICANN Policy
Development Efforts (and Lack Thereof), 940 PLI/Pat 175, 182 (2008) (“It is expected there will
be more than 100 applications early next year, and ICANN Staff has reported that there is
no technical reason that the ‘root zone’ of the internet could not support more than 60
million new TLDs!”).
54
See Farley, supra note 51, at 627 (“[B]ecause the new gTLD policy imports certain
concepts and doctrines from trademark law in an effort to address architecture issues, this
policy would result in long-term problems both for domain names and for trademark law
jurisprudence.”).
55
See Reinhardt Krause, Control of Internet is at Issue ICANN Renewal Up Europe Doesn’t
Want the U.S. Commerce Dept. in Charge of Oversight Body, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Sept.
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deter, prevent, or address abusive domain name registrations in existing
or future TLDs.56 If the Internet does experience the projected increase in
domain name registrations as a result of ICANN’s new domain name
policy, courts may be burdened with an increase of legal disputes
stemming from the policy.57 This new policy has resulted in a number of
common domain name disputes entering courtrooms across the United
States.58
E. Typical Domain Name Registration Disputes
Domain name disputes fall under a number of distinct categories,
but they all have one commonality: they exploit the increasingly popular
DNS and registration of a finite number of domain names.59
1.

Cybersquatters

The most litigated and prevalent domain name registration dispute
is known as cybersquatting.60 A cybersquatter is one who knowingly
22, 2009, at A04 (“Many U.S. industry groups, though, are concerned about ICANN’s plans
to expand top-level domains and Web addresses. They fret about trademark protection,
consumer fraud and other issues if a Wild West-like market is created for Web
addresses.”); Anick Jesdanun, ICANN Mulls Database for Trademark Holders, LAW.COM (July
17, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202432313887
(“[M]any companies fear that if ICANN suddenly adds 500 suffixes to the system, they’d
have to register their brands in each domain. Administrative costs could balloon if those
suffixes all have different rules for trademark claims.”); Andrew Noyes, ICANN’s Domain
Name Expansion Plans Draw Attention, CONGRESS DAILY, Sept. 23, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 18765545. Corporations such as
Nike, Verizon and Marriott along with trade groups like the National
Association of Manufacturers and U.S. Chamber of Commerce have
built up opposition to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers plan, claiming that it could exacerbate cyber-squatting,
fraud, and consumer confusion while forcing trademark owners to
spend more money to defend their brands.
Id.; see also Carlton, supra note 39, at 8 (“[T]he Association of National Advertisers states
that new gTLDs will generate higher ‘costs of brand management and create new
opportunities for others to infringe, phish, and engage in other deceptive practices. As a
result, brand owners and consumers will be net losers.’”); infra Part II.E (discussing the
typical domain name disputes prevalent today).
56
Rodenbaugh, supra note 53, at 184.
57
See Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 69 (focusing on the fact that as commerce on the
Internet grows, courts will be forced to apply traditional legal tenets to a new medium).
58
See generally Adam Chase, Note, A Primer on Recent Domain Name Disputes, 3 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 3 (Spring 1998), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol3/issue/vol3_art3.pdf
(detailing a number of influential domain name dispute cases).
59
See Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 70 (recognizing that as the Internet grows in volume
there are less domain names available and thus disputes over domain names were
inevitable).
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registers a domain name using the trademark or name of a company
strictly for the purpose of selling back that domain name to the
legitimate owner for a price.61 Cybersquatters attempt to profit through
the bad faith use of a trademark in which they are not the rightful
owners.62
One of the earliest cybersquatting cases, Panavision International, L.P.
v. Toeppen, is illustrative of the unscrupulous nature of cybersquatters.63
Panavision manufactured motion picture equipment and registered
In
trademarks under the names “Panavision” and “Panaflex.”64
December 1995, Panavision attempted to register the domain name
Panavision.com, but could not do so.65 An Illinois man, David Toeppen,
already registered Panavision.com along with over two hundred other
domain names for famous companies such as Delta Airlines, Neiman
Marcus, Eddie Bauer, and Lufthansa.66 The courts found that Mr.

60
See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). The court
explained that:
[C]ybersquatting occurs when a person other than the trademark
holder registers the domain name of a well known trademark and then
attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain name back
to the trademark holder or by using the domain name to divert
business from the trademark holder to the domain name holder.
Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also
Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004).
Cybersquatters are those who do as follows:
(1) ‘register well-known brand names as Internet domain names in
order to extract payment from the rightful owners of the marks;’ (2)
‘register well-known marks as domain names and warehouse those
marks with the hope of selling them to the highest bidder;’ (3) ‘register
well-known marks to prey on consumer confusion by misusing the
domain name to divert customers from the mark owner's site to the
cybersquatter's own site;’ (4) ‘target distinctive marks to defraud
consumers, including to engage in counterfeiting activities.’
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5–6 (1999)).
61
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:77
(4th ed. 2009) (noting that most cybersquatters have no intention of using the domain name
as an active website).
62
See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va.
2000). Cybersquatting is defined as the “registering, trafficking in, or using [domain
names] similar to trademarks with the bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the
trademarks.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
63
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
64
Id. at 1319.
65
Id.
66
Id. Toeppen offered to settle the matter if Panavision would pay him $13,000 in
exchange for the domain name. Id. Further, Toeppen offered to not register any other
infringing domain names. Id.; see also Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Toeppen has registered approximately 240 Internet domain names
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Toeppen was a shrewd businessman operating as a cybersquatter.67 The
Ninth Circuit concurred with the lower court’s ruling and held that
Toeppen’s actions violated a number of federal trademark laws.68
Nevada
Similar types of cybersquatting still occur today.69
gubernatorial candidate Rory Reid recently fell victim to a cybersquatter
and chose to pay $10,000 to the cybersquatter for the Internet domain
Although cybersquatters may be shrewd
name roryreid.com.70
entrepreneurs in their own eyes, Congress has enacted legislation to
illegalize such conduct.71 Additionally, cybersquatters are not the only
predators causing havoc on the Internet and the DNS.72

without seeking the permission from any entity that has previously used the names he
registered, because he contends that no permission was or is necessary.”).
67
See Panavision Int’l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1319 (“Toeppen then offered to ‘settle the matter’
if Panavision would pay him $13,000 in exchange for the domain name. . . . Toeppen has
attempted to ‘sell’ domain names for other trademarks such as intermatic.com to
Intermatic, Inc. for $10,000 and americanstandard.com to American Standard, Inc. for
$15,000.”); Intermatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1230 (“One of Toeppen’s business objectives is to
profit by the resale or licensing of these domain names, presumably to the entities who
conduct business under these names.”).
68
Panavision Int’l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1327 (affirming “the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of Panavision under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)” and holding that “Toeppen made commercial use of Panavision’s trademarks
and his conduct diluted those marks”); see also Intermatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1241. The
court held the following:
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) . . . Toeppen, and his officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert
or participation with them who receive actual notice of this final
judgment and permanent injunction are hereby permanently enjoined
from taking any action to prevent Intermatic from obtaining the
Internet domain name, “intermatic.com”, and are permanently
enjoined from asserting any further interest in “intermatic.com”
domain name . . . .
Id. (bulleted format omitted).
69
E.g., Frank Geary, Reid’s Online Site Up, in Race: Candidate Pays for Roryreid.com, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Sept. 20, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 18547790.
70
Id. Reid chose to pay the cybersquatter’s price because the $10,000 asking price was
less than the cost of litigating the matter. Id. Also, Reid’s legal team noted that any time a
party enters into arbitration or litigation there is risk involved and Reid did not want to
deal with that risk. Id.
71
See infra Part II.F.1–3 (addressing Congress’s attempts to criminalize cybersquatting).
72
See infra Part II.E.2–6 (documenting the numerous other forms of domain name
registration abuse besides cybersquatting).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/3

Borchert: Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and ICANN's Lif

2011]
2.

ICANN and the Technological Land-Grab

519

Cyberparasites

Cyberparasites, like cybersquatters, expect to reap financial benefits
from their actions.73 However, unlike cybersquatters, cyberparasites
anticipate their financial gain through the active use of a domain name.74
There are two types of tactics employed by cyberparasites.75 First, in
some cases one party registers another competitor’s famous name.76 In
the alternative, a party registers a mark that is remarkably similar to an
official mark, or may register a commonly mistyped or misspelled
version of a famous name.77 The registration of domain names that
closely resemble those of popular domain names but are mistyped or
misspelled is generally known as typosquatting.78 One emblematic
example is 1800contacts.com, an online retailer of contact lenses. If the
consumer
enters
18oocontacts.com,
18000contacts.com,
or
1888contacts.com the consumer arrives at a typosquatter domain site that
is designed to lead him or her into buying lenses from a competing
seller.79 These typosquatting sites are known as ad parking sites, and
typosquatters make advertising money when users, who intended to go
to 1800contacts.com, click on sponsored links for other contact lens
sellers.80 Although these types of domain name disputes involve
arguably deceptive means to profit, some domain name disputes arise
out of legitimate name ownership disputes.

Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 73 (positing that cyberparasites, like cybersquatters, plan
to profit from their illegal activities).
74
Id.
75
See Comp. Exam’r Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213-WMB (CTx), 1996 WL
376600, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 1996).
76
Id. In this case, Comp. Examiner Agency, Inc. illegally registered second level domain
name juris.com, which happened to be a registered trademark belonging to Juris, Inc. Id.
Comp. Examiner Agency, Inc. posted advertisements for their products and services on the
illegally registered domain name site, which were in direct competition with Juris, Inc. Id.
77
See Steve DelBianco & Braden Cox, ICANN Internet Governance: Is It Working?, 21 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 27, 33 (2008) (calculating that almost half of all
Internet users choose to type the domain name of a website directly into their browser’s
address bar and as such misspellings are inevitable).
78
Id. DelBianco and Cox explain that typosquatting is the registration of domain names
that are spelled incorrectly but bear a resemblance to already established popular website.
Id. If an Internet user does mistakenly misspell the domain name, they may end up at a
typosquatter’s website. Id. Usually at such a site Internet users will find advertisements
for products or services that directly compete with the legitimate site. Id.
79
Id. at 34. Sedo, the current leader in “parking” domain names, uses different
variations of the 1800contacts.com domain name to generate their advertising revenue
when users mistakenly click on their sponsored links leading them to other contact lens
vendors. Id.
80
Id.
73
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Cyber Twins

When a domain name holder and the challenger have a legitimate
claim to a domain name, they are known as cyber twins.81 More often
than not, cyber twin cases are the most difficult for courts to decide
because in the absence of a domain name dispute, both parties would
otherwise likely be able to enjoy concurrent use of the name under
traditional trademark law.82 In Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd. v.
International Foodstuffs Co., the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) Arbitration and Mediation Center heard argument over the
domain name iffco.com.83 The defendant properly registered the
iffco.com domain name, but the complainant had other domain names
related to iffco.com and had a reasonable interest in that particular
domain name.84 Although the complainant alleged that the defendant
was diverting Internet users to its own website, the Arbitration Center
dismissed the case because the complainant failed to prove any “bad
faith” on the part of the defendant, despite the fact that both parties had
a legitimate interest in the domain name.85
4.

Land-Grab

A parallel abuse of the domain name registration system, called a
land-grab, may occur whenever a new TLD is released. Internet
speculators, much akin to those who homesteaded the western United
States during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, register hundreds or
even thousands of names in the new domain in hopes of locking up

Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 74.
Id. “The cases involving cyber twins are the most difficult ones, because, but for the
domain name dispute, the law of trade mark and unfair competition might otherwise allow
each party to enjoy concurrent use of the name.” Id.; see also Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Astro-Med, Inc., No. C-95-20602-JW, 1996 WL 369100, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1996)
(exhibiting a fight over the trademarked name “SUNDANCE” in which both parties have a
legitimate claim to such a use).
83
Indian Farmers Fertiliser Coop. Ltd. v. Int’l Foodstuffs Co., WIPO Case No. D20011110, § 2 (WIPO Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/
2001/d2001-1110.html.
84
Id. at § 4; Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 74. The Arbitration Center held that “[t]he
defendants had registered the domain name ‹ iffco.com› [sic] and had been using it with
good faith.” Id.
85
Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 74. The case was dismissed “as both the parties had
legitimate interest in the domain name and the complainant had failed to prove ‘bad faith’
on the part of the defendant.” Id.
81
82

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/3

Borchert: Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and ICANN's Lif

2011]

ICANN and the Technological Land-Grab

521

names similar to those of legitimate businesses and organizations.86
Then, for financial gain, the speculators hold the domain names ransom
from the legitimate owner of the names or use them for typosquatting
and ad parking.87
The most recent occurrence of a land-grab occurred when the .eu
Opportunistic
top-level domain name was created for Europe.88
registrants quickly registered names that legitimate businesses and
organizations already held in other top-level domains.89 In response
EURid, the non-profit organization in charge of operating the .eu
registry, suspended 74,000 .eu domain names and sued four hundred
registrars for breach of contract.90
5.

Domain Sharking/Tasting/Kiting

Domain name sharking, tasting, or kiting are all synonymous with a
certain type of domain name registration abuse. Under these tactics,
speculators look for sites where they can place or “park” ads to take
advantage of the five-day grace period between the time a new domain
name is initially registered and the time when the registration fee must
be paid.91
In May 2006, out of thirty five million domain name registrations,
approximately 2.7 million, or 7.7%, of registered names were
purchased.92 Domain name speculators register huge numbers of
86
See DelBianco & Cox, supra note 77, at 35 (instructing that in a typical land-grab
scenario violators will register thousands of new names in the new domain in the hopes of
locking up sites similar to those of functioning businesses and organizations).
87
Id. (detailing how domain name speculators demand a ransom or use the domain
names for typesquatting and ad parking).
88
Id.
89
Id.; see also GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 8.02
(Aspen 2010) (stating that there have been substantial difficulties with Internet speculators
and misunderstandings of the registration process surrounding the unveiling of the .eu
top-level domain).
90
Roland Buck, EURid Accuses Registrars of Stockpiling 74,000 .eu Domain Names, DOMAIN
NEWS (June 18, 2008), http://www.domainnews.com/en/eurid-accuses-registrars-ofstockpiling-74000-.eu-domain-names.html. EURid accused “400 US based registrars of
stockpiling over 74,000 .eu domain names . . . . [and] registering them speculatively for
resale.” Id.
91
DelBianco & Cox, supra note 77, at 35 (detailing the typical ad parking procedure
conducted by Internet speculators).
92
Bob Parsons, 35 Million Names Registered in May. Only 8% of Registrations Were Paid.
32 Million Were Part of a Scam. It's Called "Domain Kiting.”, BOBPARSONS.ME (June 21, 2006),
http://www.bobparsons.me/118/35-million-names-registered-only-registrations-paid-32part-scam-called-domain-kitinG.html. Internet statistics show that
[j]ust over 35 million names were registered for the month of May. Of
those just over 2.7 million were permanent registrations. That means
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domain names that they believe may be profitable and then statistically
track how many accidental visits each site receives.93 If a site generates
little traffic during the grace period, the speculator lets the domain name
lapse without paying the registration fee.94 Recently, ICANN passed a
resolution to eliminate domain tasting, but no further action has been
pursued beyond that.95
6.

Reverse Domain Name Hijacking

The final notable domain name registration dispute is known as
“reverse domain name hijacking.” This occurs in cases where the
complainant attempts to overextend the scope of their famous name by
using one of the domain dispute resolution remedies in bad faith.96
Ultimately, the existence of a cause of action for reverse domain name
hijacking requires trademark owners to exercise caution to avoid filing
frivolous claims in their domain name registration disputes.97 As
that 92.3% of all domain names registered were part of a scam now
known as domain kiting. These names were kept off of the market,
they were used to generate search engine revenue—AND BECAUSE
OF A LOOPHOLE ICANN REFUSES TO ELIMINATE—those 32.3
million names were used without being paid for.
Id.
See DelBianco & Cox, supra note 77, at 35 (noting that of the 35 million domain name
registrations in April 2006, only 2 million were permanently purchased and that a large
portion of the remaining 33 million were part of a sharking scheme); Elizabeth M.
Flanagan, Note, No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from Trademark-Infringing Domain Name
Parking, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1160, 1166 (Sept.–Oct. 2008) (expressing that Internet users
typically reach ad parked websites by either incorrectly guessing a domain name or
because they commit typographical errors).
94
DelBianco & Cox, supra note 77, at 35. Alternatively, if the site generates a lot of
traffic, the speculator may use it to park ads to generate revenue without having to expend
any effort. Id. at 35−36.
95
Sachoff, supra note 52 (detailing ICANN’s resolution seeking to eliminate domain
tasting and prevent speculators from using the loophole of registration grace periods to see
what names will be the most profitable).
96
Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 74 (articulating that the complainant in some cases will
overextend their famous name); Ian L. Stewart, Note, The Best Laid Plans: How Unrestrained
Arbitration Decisions Have Corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 509, 513 (2001). Reverse domain name hijacking is defined as the “bad
faith . . . attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain name.” Stewart,
supra (citation omitted). ICANN defined reverse domain name hijacking as “using the
Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain
name.” Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, para. 1, 15(e),
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010)
[hereinafter ICANN Rules].
97
See Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that
the ACPA provides a very limited registrar liability that nullifies most suits against
registrars); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
93
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suggested by the variety of domain name registration disputes and their
increasing pervasiveness, Internet stakeholders enacted remedial
measures to ensure the continued success and integrity of the DNS.98
F.

Remedial Responses to Domain Name Disputes

During the early stages of the Internet and well before it became
ubiquitous, courts simply applied traditional trademark law to this new
However, traditional trademark law and its two
technology.99
underlying principles—(1) to prevent confusion in the public and (2) to
protect the owner’s investment in the mark—proved to be unwieldy and
limiting in Internet domain name cases.100 As a result, in 1995, the
United States Congress amended the Lanham Act and passed the first
federal statute addressing the intersection of trademark and Internet
issues.101 Subsequently, a number of remedial legislative measures have
been enacted and applied in domain name disputes.102

625 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the reverse domain name hijacking provision of the ACPA
protects domain name registrants from overreaching trademark owners); see also KENT D.
STUCKEY ET AL., INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 7.07, ¶ [1][c], (2009) (cautioning trademark
owners to prudently employ the ACPA because under certain circumstances domain name
registrants can counter with a reverse domain name hijacking suit).
98
See Kathrun Miller Goldman & Cynthia Blake Sanders, Intellectual Property Issues for
You and Your Small Business, 1 ANN.2001 ATLA-CLE 1025 (2001) (providing that besides
traditional trademark actions, two additional remedies were created to allow a trademark
owner protection against persons who register a domain name using the trademark).
99
Howard, supra note 39, at 647 (noting how courts have toiled in dealing with
trademark abuses in domain names, first by applying traditional trademark infringement
and dilution law).
100
See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We are the
third panel of this court in just over a year faced with the challenging task of applying
centuries-old trademark law to the newest medium of communication—the Internet.”); see
also Block, supra note 27, at 438 (explaining that there was no federal anti-dilution law prior
to 1996 so trademark owners attempted to combat dilution through a variety of state laws);
Howard, supra note 39, at 637–38 (analyzing that in early cases courts used traditional
trademark law, like trademark infringement and later trademark dilution, to provide
redress to mark owners).
101
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2002)); see also Elizabeth D. Lauzon,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), 177 A.L.R. FED. 1, 1 (2002) (noting that the Amendment to the
Lanham Act provided stronger remedies against cybersquatters).
102
See infra Part II.F. (detailing the passage and implementation of the FTDA, TDRA,
ACPA, and the UDRP).
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Federal Trademark Dilution Act

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), enacted January 16,
1996, created a federal cause of action for trademark dilution.103
Congress specifically promulgated the FTDA to address Internet domain
name registration issues.104 Congress, however, failed to offer any notion
of how trademark owners could prove dilution, which granted courts a
huge amount of discretion in their decision making.105 A plaintiff must
prove four distinct factors for a court to find a violation of the FTDA:
“(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant makes a commercial use of the
mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became
Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). The statute states the following:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after
the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or
trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence
or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.
Id. The statute then lays out the factors that courts should use to determine if a mark is
distinctive and famous:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner
or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (bulleted format modified); see also Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that domain
names must be affiliated to some commercialized goods or services of the registrant);
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (reiterating the statutory
definition of dilution, which is “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception” (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999))).
104
See 104 CONG. REC. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy). Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) stated that the legislative history of the Act
indicated that it was created to deal with domain name conflicts. Id. Senator Leahy
declared “it is my hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive
Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the
products and reputations of others.” Id.
105
See Matthew S. Voss, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265,
266 (2000) (commenting that the language of the Dilution Act may have provided guidance
on how to determine if a trademark is sufficiently famous to deserve protection but
remains silent on how to actually prove dilution).
103
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famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark dilutes its quality by
diminishing its capacity to identify and distinguish goods and
services.”106
One of the early cases in which a plaintiff claimed an FTDA violation
occurred in ActMedia, Inc. v. Active Media International Inc.107 The
defendant’s registration of the name “actmedia.com” without the
authorization of the plaintiff, who conducted business under the name
Actmedia since 1972 and registered the trademark, was ruled to be a
violation of the FTDA.108 Judging the application of the FTDA in cases
like ActMedia, many courts and legal scholars saw the FTDA as an
adequate first attempt to legally address domain name registration
disputes.109 However, scholars ultimately determined that the FTDA
missed its intended mark because it failed to adequately protect
trademark owners.110 Therefore, further legislation was needed to
adequately preserve the domain name registration system.
2.

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006

Congress revised the prior FTDA in 2006 with the enactment of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”).111 This revision
eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff must establish actual dilution
to succeed in its claim and created instead the new “likelihood of

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466357, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996).
108
Id. at *1–2 (holding that the defendant’s reservation of the domain name violated 15
U.S.C. § 1125 because it was an unauthorized use and misappropriation of the plaintiff’s
trademark and also because the use of the mark constituted “false designation of origin”).
109
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1237–38 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The court
reasoned that the new law “benefits only ‘famous’ trademarks.” Id. at 1237. Furthermore,
[u]nder the Act, the owner of a famous mark is only entitled to
injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to
cause dilution of the famous mark. The Act does not preempt state
dilution claims. The Act specifically provides that noncommercial use
of the mark is not actionable.
Id. at 1238 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (1994)).
110
See Howard, supra note 39, at 638, 643. Howard concluded that the FTDA had a major
limitation. Id. at 638. Trademark infringement and dilution did not provide proper legal
redress for the trademark owner. Id. As a result courts stretched the original intent of the
law to try and incorporate domain names into traditional trademark law in the name of
equity and justice. Id.
111
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006);
Perla M. Kuhn, Trademarks as Competitive Tools-Obtaining and Protecting Them, ASPATORE, at
1, 8, available at 2009 WL 534745.
106
107
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dilution” standard.112 To establish a prima facie case of dilution under
the TDRA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the plaintiff is the owner of a
mark that qualifies as a famous mark, (2) the mark is distinctive, (3) the
defendant is making commercial use of the mark in interstate commerce,
(4) defendant’s use began after plaintiff’s mark became famous, and (5)
there is a likelihood of dilution.”113 However, federal courts interpreting
this new standard have made it extremely challenging for plaintiffs to
prove a likelihood of dilution.114 Dilution can occur in two distinct ways,
by “blurring” or by “tarnishment.”115 Presently, limited case law
employing the likelihood of dilution standard exists; thus, the law
continues to change and develop.116
3.

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”)

Congress also addressed the DNS issue when it passed the ACPA in
1999 as another amendment to the Lanham Act.117 Courts read the
ACPA to reach outside of what the FTDA and Lanham Act previously
See Melvyn J. Simburg et al., International Intellectual Property Law, 41 INT’L LAW. 379,
386 (2007). The authors explained that the FTDA
was a response to, and overrules, the Supreme Court’s widely
criticized holding in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., in which the
Court, addressing the split among the lower courts over the more
subjective “likelihood of dilution” standard, held that actual dilution
was required in order for famous marks to qualify for injunctive relief
under the FTDA.
Id. (citing Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)); see also Jeremy M. Roe,
Note, The Current State of Antidilution Law: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act and the
Identical Mark Presumption, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 589 (2008) (claiming that the open-ended
likelihood to dilute standard is open to judicial interpretation).
113
98 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Dilution of a Trademark § 5 (2007).
114
See Kuhn, supra note 111, at 20−21 (noting that courts interpreting the TDRA have yet
to answer a number of questions including how much of a burden the plaintiff must bear in
demonstrating the level of fame of its mark and the necessary degree of similarity between
the plaintiff’s mark and the diluting mark).
115
See Simburg et al., supra note 112, at 387 (commenting that the TDRA provides greater
certainty in determining when dilution has occurred by defining and differentiating
between “blurring” and “tarnishment”). Dilution by blurring is defined as an “association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” Id. (citation omitted). The definition of
tarnishment is an “‘association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.’” Roe, supra note 112, at
583 (citation omitted).
116
See generally Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (failing to answer how a plaintiff successfully
proves a likelihood of dilution by blurring); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 267−68 (4th Cir. 2007) (ruling impliedly that the more famous the
mark, the less likely that dilution by blurring will be determined); Kuhn, supra note 111, at
20 (proclaiming that the application of the TDRA is new and still evolving).
117
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–1117, § 1125(d) (2006).
112
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addressed.118 Specifically, the ACPA provided two additional weapons
for trademark owners to protect their trademarks that were previously
unavailable: jurisdiction and statutory damages.119 To present a
successful claim under the ACPA, the complainant must plead that the
violator had a bad faith intent to profit.120 Further, the statute has nine
118
See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260–61 (4th Cir. 2002). The
court concluded that the promulgation of the ACPA
eliminated any need to force trademark-dilution law beyond its
traditional bounds in order to fill a past hole, now otherwise plugged,
in protection of trademark rights.
As the Second Circuit recently remarked, the ACPA “was
adopted specifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to
stretching federal dilution law when dealing with cybersquatting
cases.”
Id. at 261−62 (quoting Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d
Cir. 2000)); see also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426
(E.D. Va. 2000). The court claimed that the ACPA was not
designed to combat domain name registrants utterly ignorant of
certain existing trademarks, or those registrants with a good faith
reason to believe that they have the right to register certain domain
names. On the contrary, as its title reflects, the AntiCybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act was designed to combat “cybersquatting” or
“cyberpiracy,” defined as “registering, trafficking in, or using similar
to trademarks with the bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the
trademarks.”
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999) and citing S. REP. NO. 106-140 (1999)); see also S.
REP. NO. 106-140, at 4, 17 (1999). The report provides that the legislative purpose of the
ACPA was
to protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth
of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark
owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of
distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit
from the goodwill associated with such marks—a practice commonly
referred to as “cybersquatting.”
Id. at 4. “This section [was intended] to encourage domain name registrars and registries to
work with trademark owners to prevent cybersquatting.” Id. at 17.
119
See Gore, supra note 29, at 203. Benefits of the ACPA include the following:
First, the ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction against the domain
name itself, which alleviates trademark owners’ difficulties in locating
the domain name’s registrant, since many cybersquatters register
domain names under aliases and use false information to avoid being
identified. Second, in regards to remedies, the ACPA allows a court to
award injunctive relief barring the defendant’s further use of the
domain name, cancellation or transference of the domain name to the
plaintiff, actual damages and profits, attorneys’ fees, and statutory
damages in an amount between $1,000 and $100,000 per domain name.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Brenda R. Sharton, Domain Name Disputes: To Sue or
Not to Sue, 44 B. B.J., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 10, 11.
120
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“A person shall be liable in a civil
action . . . if . . . that person . . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . . .”).
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non-exclusive factors for determining a person’s bad faith intent to
profit.121
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,122 Lockheed Martin
brought claims of trademark infringement and dilution under the ACPA
against a domain name registrar for failure to protect trademarks and
prevent the registration of a number of domains using the trademark
names owned by Lockheed Martin.123 The district court held that the
registrar did not incur cybersquatting liability by registering and
maintaining domain names that allegedly infringed the owner’s
trademarks.124 Due to these problems, ICANN developed its own
121

Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). The nine non-exclusive factors considered are:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to
identify that person;
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark
in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that
could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in
the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the domain
name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact
information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous
at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the
meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section.

Id.
122
123
124
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remedial system in addition to Congress’s efforts to create legislation to
improve the domain name system and to minimize domain name
disputes.125
4.

Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (“UDRP”) on October 24, 1999.126 The UDRP provides for
electronic arbitration of domain name disputes between trademark
owners and domain name registrants.127 The UDRP exists as a “fasttrack” alternative to traditional court proceedings.128 One benefit of the
UDRP is that in order to register a domain name, the registrant has to
agree to comply with the UDRP, which provides some redress for
disputes that may arise.129 However, the UDRP is limited in that it only
It is quite understandable that Congress did not cause defendant as a
domain name registrar, or as keeper of the registry, to be subject to
civil liability under § 1125(d). . . . Defendant simply could not function
as a registrar, or as keeper of the registry, if it had to become entangled
in, and bear the expense of, disputes regarding the right of a registrant
to use a particular domain name.
Id.
See Rohrer, supra note 26, at 573 (outlining ICANN’s adoption of the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy as a mandatory administrative proceeding that governs
all domain name registrants).
126
Id.
127
See Brett R. Harris et al., PIERCING THE REGISTRANT’S VEIL: Trademark
Infringement on the Internet, Identifying and Pursuing Infringers, and the Pros and Cons of Proxy
Domain Name Registration, N.J. LAW., June 2009, at 46, 47 (explaining that ICANN provides
the UDRP as an arbitration proceeding to resolve a trademark infringement based on the
domain name itself and not the content found when one visits the website connected to the
domain name); see also Goldman & Sanders, supra note 98, at II; Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, ¶ 1, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy24oct99.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter ICANN Policy]. ICANN incorporates
the UDRP into the domain name Registration Agreement. ICANN Policy, supra, ¶ 1.
Within that agreement there are terms and conditions that dictate any disputes over
domain name registrations. Id.
128
Rodenbaugh, supra note 53, at 179 (elucidating that ICANN privately formulated the
UDRP as a fast-track remedy for trademark cybersquatting that avoided court actions to
recover misappropriated names); Nicole K. McLaughlin, A Warning to Overreaching
Trademark Owners: ACPA Gives Domain Name Registrants Cause of Action, THE L.
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 3, 2002, at 5, available at 2002 WLNR 15048896 (expounding that the
UDRP maintains authority in disputes between potential cybersquatters and third-party
trademark owners); see also Geary, supra note 69 (stating that, typically, a UDRP proceeding
resolves such disputes within two to three months).
129
See Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 77 (noting that domain name registrants are required
to avail themselves to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event of any domain
name disputes). The ICANN approved resolution providers are the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO), National Arbitration Forum (NAF), Centre for Public
Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPRIDR), eResolution Consortium (eRes), and
125
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addresses the .com, .net, and .org TLDs.130 Furthermore, the UDRP only
covers claims that the registrant’s domain name infringes on a
trademark.131
To prevail under the UDRP, the complainant must prove that the
domain name is: (1) identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s
trademark; (2) that the domain name registrant has no legitimate
interests in the domain name; and (3) that the domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith.132 The UDRP formula for
determining bad faith appears to be a close relative to the nine factor bad
faith test set forth in the ACPA.133 A panel of one or three decisionmakers hears an UDRP proceeding, and then submits a written decision
as to the registration of the disputed domain name.134 The panel
members employ the rules of procedure established by ICANN and
operate under any principles of law deemed necessary.135 According to

the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). Id.; see also ICANN
Policy, supra note 127, ¶ 4 (explaining that all domain registrants automatically avail
themselves to UDRP proceedings to resolve any domain name disputes). See generally
ICANN Rules, supra note 96 (outlining the rules of the UDRP proceedings).
130
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104
(WIPO Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1104.html (ruling that the UDRP has a small scope); see also Goldman &
Sanders, supra note 98, at II.
131
See Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in The Arbitration-Law Context: Consent
to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129, 146 (2002) (explaining that
UDRP proceedings only cover claims that a registrant’s name infringes upon a trademark
or a servicemark).
132
Goldman & Sanders, supra note 98, at II (satisfying these three elements of the UDRP
allows a rightful domain name owner to reclaim or cancel an infringing name).
133
See Cnty. Bookshops Ltd. v. Guy Loveday, WIPO Case No. D2000-0655, at 4 (WIPO
Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-0655.html (analyzing a dispute by determining whether the domain name at
issue is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or servicemark in which the
complainant has rights); see also Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44
B.C. L. REV. 359, 379 (2003) (explicating that although the U.S. Government wandered from
the exact UDRP formula with the passage of the ACPA, overall the ACPA’s bad faith test
parallels the terms in the UDRP that should trigger a domain name transfer). Compare 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (detailing the ACPA’s nine factor bad faith test), with
ICANN Policy, supra note 127, ¶ 4(a)–(b) (laying out the criteria for determining when a
valid dispute exists and when bad faith registration has occurred).
134
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651–52 (N.D.
Tex. 2001); see also Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(stating that the panel may consist of either one or three members to conduct the inquiry).
135
See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
624 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The UDRP is intended to provide a quick process for resolving domain
name disputes by submitting them to authorized panels or panel members operating under
rules of procedure established by ICANN and under ‘any rules and principles of law that
[the panel] deems applicable.’”) (quoting ICANN Policy, supra note 127, ¶ 15(a)).
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ICANN’s most recently released statistics, over 7700 UDRP disputes
were resolved in the less than five years of UDRP proceedings.136
In
March
2009,
ICANN
formed
the
Implementation
Recommendation Team (“IRT”) to seek solutions to any potential risks to
trademark holders upon the release of the new gTLD policy.137 In its
work, the IRT analyzed current trademark protections and responded
with new proposals to aid current trademark holders.138 The proposal of
these new measures demonstrated the divide between existing remedial
measures and the risk for future abuses with the lifting of restrictions on
domain name registrations. Following the advent of the Internet and its
ubiquitous rise, a disconnect developed between trademark law and
domain name policy.139
III. ANALYSIS
In the next Part of this Note, Part III.A will first review the successes
and shortcomings of the remedial measures for domain name disputes
provided for by the FTDA, TDRA, ACPA, and UDRP. Next, Part III.B
analyzes ICANN’s five primary proposed solutions to limit domain
name problems that may accompany the release of the new gTLD policy.
A. Lackluster Remedial Measures for Domain Name Disputes
As discussed in Part II.F of this Note, four major remedial measures
currently govern domain name disputes: the FTDA, TDRA, ACPA, and
136
See Laurence R. Helfer, Whither the UDRP: Autonomous, Americanized, or Cosmopolitan?,
12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 494–95 (2004) (recognizing that since the UDRP’s
inception more than 7000 disputes have been decided while only a few hundred have been
formally adjudicated in national courts in the same period); see also Archived Statistical
Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (May
10, 2004), http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (expounding upon the
graphical analysis shows that as of May 10, 2004, 7790 UDRP proceedings were disposed
by decision).
137
See Introduction: Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT), ICANN, 1 (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/irt-draft-report-trademark-protection24apr09-en.pdf (indicating that the IRT was formed March 6, 2009, by ICANN Board
resolution to assess risks of the new gTLD policy).
138
Id. at 2–3 (“[T]he IRT was constrained to prioritize the list of proposals . . . which are
hoped may make available solutions to address some of the immediate concerns of the
stakeholders . . . .”); see An Open Letter from the IRT Introducing Our Work, ICANN, 2 (May
29,
2009),
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/irt-final-report-trademarkprotection-29may09-en.pdf [hereinafter IRT Letter] (reporting the IRT’s goal “to
provide . . . ‘a tapestry of globally-effective solutions’ which . . . will help reduce the
incidence and severity of trademark abuse in the new gTLDs”).
139
See Farley, supra note 51, at 632 (noting that although law and technology have grown
closer through time, trademark law and domain names remain incongruent).
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the UDRP.140 Each measure provides some sort of redress to victims of
domain name registration abuse.
1.

FTDA141

The federal government, in an initial attempt to address domain
name registration disputes, passed the FTDA to prohibit the dilution of
commercially used and famous trademarks.142 For a plaintiff to prevail,
the statutory language states that the trademark must be “famous;”
however, in practice, proving a mark to be “famous” is a rather difficult
task.143 Numerous courts have concluded that to be “famous” under the
traditional dilution standard, a trademark must be eminent and well
known.144 In addition to the lofty famous standard, courts have
criticized the statutory requirement that any infringing use must be
“commercial.”145 Under the commercial use umbrella, proof of an FTDA
violation requires that the domain names must be attached to some
140
See supra Part II.F (addressing the four major remedial measures governing domain
name disputes).
141
See supra Part II.F.1 (detailing the promulgation of the FTDA and some of the
documented violations of the Act).
142
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (covering the factors used in determining
dilution of a trademark).
143
See supra note 103 (outlining the high mark that a plaintiff must reach to warrant the
“famous” standard); see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir.
1999) (interpreting the high standard of famousness as being “invented and reserved for a
select class of marks—those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even
non-competing uses can impinge on their value”); Howard, supra note 39, at 647 (noting
that the first requirement, that the mark be famous, is a very subjective and high standard
to meet).
144
See Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875 (noting that a mark must be both prominent
and renowned to be judged as famous under trademark dilution) (citing I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998)) (quoting 3 J. Thomas McCarthy,
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.91 (2d ed. 1984)).
145
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The statute synonymously defines commercial or use in
commerce as “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade.” Id. A mark is
deemed to be in use in commerce
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or
the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed
thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement
impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their
sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce . . . .
Id.; see also Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 880 (“Commercial use under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using the trademark as a trademark,
capitalizing on its trademark status.”).
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commercial goods or services of the domain name registrant.146 Courts
quickly recognized the possible injustice of not holding the registration
of a domain name itself as a commercial use and consequently began to
stretch the original intent of the statute.147 This extrapolation beyond the
statutory language demonstrated that traditional trademark law of
infringement and dilution had important limitations.148 Due to the
FTDA’s shortcomings in regard to these Internet domain name issues,
Congress proactively made subsequent legislative attempts and enacted
the ACPA in 1999 and the TDRA in 2006.
2.

TDRA149

Congress’s revision of the FTDA in the form of the TDRA
strengthened the protection afforded to famous trademarks.150 The
TDRA changed the standard of proof necessary to succeed on a dilution
claim to the newly articulated “likelihood of dilution” standard, which
differed from the former “actual dilution” standard under the FTDA.151
Additionally, the TDRA provides trademark holders with a more
definitive idea of when dilution has actually occurred due to the clearly

146
See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276,
1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (ruling that simply registering a domain name does not equate to a
commercial use).
147
See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998). In its ruling
the court stretched the original intent of the statute to find dilution by stating that it did not
have to rely solely “on the traditional definitions” of “blurring” and “tarnishment.” Id.
Instead, the court found dilution happened because “[p]rospective users of plaintiff’s
services who mistakenly access defendant’s web site may fail to continue to search for
plaintiff’s own home page.” Id. at 1327. Ultimately, following a review of the trial court’s
factual findings, the court found that “Toeppen’s ‘business’ [was] to register trademarks as
domain names and then sell them to the rightful trademark owners,” and further that he
acted as a “spoiler,” and “prevent[ed] Panavision and others from doing business on the
Internet under their trademarked names unless they pay his fee.’” Id. at 1325 (citation
omitted); see also Howard, supra note 39, at 650 (discussing that courts attempted to stretch
the statute to find commercial use and dilution in cases where the violators sold no goods
or placed no advertisements on the site).
148
See Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 871 (noting that traditional trademark law does
not mesh well with the modern Internet).
149
See supra Part II.F.2 (explaining the enactment of the TDRA and the changes it
implemented to bolster the FTDA).
150
See Simburg et al., supra note 112, at 386 (clarifying that the TDRA promulgation in
fact boosted the protection afforded famous marks and also addressed any uncertainty
within the federal courts in their respective applications of the FTDA).
151
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003). The majority opinion
stated that “direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if
actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is
one where the junior and senior marks are identical.” Id.
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proscribed definitions of blurring and tarnishment.152 Overall, the TDRA
was a positive step forward for antidilution law and protection of
trademark holders.153 However, the TDRA fell short by failing to
specifically articulate the requirements to meet the new “likelihood of
dilution” standard.154
3.

ACPA155

The passage of the ACPA eliminated the need to overextend
trademark dilution law beyond its intended limit under the original
FTDA.156 The two most profound additions that the ACPA brought to
domain name dispute resolution were in rem jurisdiction and actual and
statutory damage awards between $1000 and $100,000 per violating
domain name.157 Before passage of the ACPA, in personam personal
jurisdiction was the only available tool, which accordingly allowed many
anonymous or foreign defendants to escape personal jurisdiction
because no alternative cause of action existed for plaintiffs.158
Furthermore, the ACPA replaced the FTDA’s arbitrary famous and
152
See Simburg et al., supra note 112, at 387 (stating that the TDRA extends trademark
owners concrete definitions of blurring and tarnishment as well as allowing a better
understanding of when another mark is dilutive).
153
See Roe, supra note 112, at 605 (evaluating the TDRA as an effective addition to the
FTDA because the TDRA recognized and addressed the FTDA’s major shortcomings).
154
See Kuhn, supra note 111, at 20–21. Courts interpreting the TDRA have failed to
answer “the burden a plaintiff must bear in demonstrating the fame of its mark . . . and
what plaintiff needs to show to establish dilution by blurring beyond a mental association
between the famous and dilutive marks.” Id.
155
See supra Part II.F.3 (detailing the enacting of the ACPA and some of the documented
violations of the Act).
156
See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2002). The
court concluded that the promulgation of the ACPA
eliminated any need to force trademark-dilution law beyond its
traditional bounds in order to fill a past hole, now otherwise plugged,
in protection of trademark rights.
As the Second Circuit recently remarked, the ACPA “was
adopted specifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to
stretching federal dilution law when dealing with cybersquatting
cases.”
Id. (quoting Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000)).
157
See Gore, supra note 29, at 203. The ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction against the
domain name itself. Id. Thus, parties that have a legitimate interest in a domain name no
longer have to locate the infringing wrongful registrants. Id. Additionally, the ACPA
permits courts to award damages, attorneys’ fees, and statutory damages ranging from
$1000 to $100,000 per domain name. Id. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2006) (creating in
rem jurisdiction), with Lauzon, supra note 101, §§ 6–8 (stating that in rem actions cannot be
concurrent with in personam jurisdiction).
158
Lauzon, supra note 101, § 21(b) (highlighting the ACPA’s addition of in rem
jurisdiction as an additional weapon to fight domain name cybersquatting).
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commercial standards with a more workable and exhaustive list of nine
factors that courts could use to determine a bad faith intent to profit in
violation of the ACPA.159 However, even the nine factor bad faith test
has drawn criticism, with claims that it is ambiguous and unwieldy.160
Despite the improvements that the ACPA made to legally address
domain name disputes following in the footsteps of the FTDA, the ACPA
has been consistently criticized for being too narrow in scope.161 Due to
that narrow scope, the ACPA’s in rem personal jurisdiction has become
less forceful and functional to American plaintiffs because it has become
increasingly easy to avoid by using domain name registrars outside of
the United States when obtaining a domain name.162 Consequently,
ICANN’s new gTLD policy that will dramatically increase the number of
domain names registered across the globe will also create more domain
names capable of circumventing the ACPA’s in rem personal jurisdiction
and will do so on a much larger scale.163
Besides the jurisdictional changes, the ACPA granted domain name
registrars safe harbor from liability for registering an infringing domain
name.164 Specifically, the ACPA limits the liability of a registrar or

159
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); supra note 121 (laying out the nine factors that are
considered for determining a bad faith intent to profit).
160
See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 234 (4th Cir.
2002) (explaining that there is no set approach to formulate and weigh the factors). Courts
do not tally which party has more factors in its favor and then rule accordingly. Id. The
ACPA’s legislative history explicitly states that the presence or absence of any of the nine
factors is not necessarily outcome determinative in the dispute. Id.
161
See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va.
2000) (explaining that the court’s interpretation adheres to the legislative history of the
ACPA, which clearly states that the statute is narrow in scope); see also Solid Host, N.L. v.
Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[The] ACPA was enacted to
counter cybersquatting, a narrow class of wrongdoing . . . .”).
162
Magier, supra note 30, at 444–45. It would be quite easy for a cybersquatter to register
their chosen domain name with any of the number of registrars located outside of the
United States. Id. Doing so would allow the cybersquatter to avoid any basis for in rem
jurisdiction under the provisions of the ACPA. Id.
163
Id. at 447. The author reflects that the increasing complexity of the Internet
will spur the creation of more TLDs and more registries in many
different countries. As the need for more TLDs increases, therefore,
registries will follow the same pattern of internationalization seen in
the registrar industry. Consequently, the ACPA’s in rem personal
jurisdiction provision will be further undermined and of less and less
use to American plaintiffs in taking action against cybersquatters.
Id.
164
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(D)(ii) (declaring that “[t]he domain name registrar or registry or
other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this
paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful
failure to comply with any such court order”); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
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registry in regard to registering, transferring, disabling, or cancelling a
domain name, even if that domain name is ultimately determined to be
dilutive or infringing upon a trademark.165 Subsequently, courts have
enforced the limited liability of domain name registrars under the ACPA
to protect both the efficiency of the domain name registration system as a
whole and also the functionality of the alternate domain name dispute
resolution avenue, the UDRP.166 The ACPA recognizes the UDRP only
insofar as it forms part of the general contractually accepted policy that
registrars abide by in administering domain names.167 Beyond that, the
UDRP’s relevance to actions brought under the ACPA exists under two
specific contexts: (1) limiting the liability of a domain name registration
that is done by a reasonable policy (including the UDRP); and (2) the
ability to bring an ACPA suit for a victim of domain name transfer under
that reasonable policy (again including the UDRP).168 Although courts

Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that domain registrars are
immune from liability when acting in their normal capacities as registrars).
165
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(ii)(II). The ACPA states that a registrar or registry will not be
held liable for injunctive or monetary relief of a domain name registration if it is done “in
the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority
prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or
dilutive of another's mark.” Id.
166
See Lockheed Martin Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 655. The court posited that if it were to
allow for registrar liability
[the] Defendant simply could not function as a registrar, or as keeper
of the registry, if it had to become entangled in, and bear the expense
of, disputes regarding the right of a registrant to use a particular
domain name. . . . The reason the UDRP was developed was to provide
the mechanism to resolve these disputes. Not only would imposing
plaintiff’s scheme render the UDRP nugatory, it would cause the
domain name registration system in its entirety not to be feasible.
Id.
167
See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
625 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the UDRP only as it represents part of a policy followed by
domain name registrars).
168
Id. The court states that the UDRP is relevant to actions brought under the ACPA in
two contexts:
First, the ACPA limits the liability of a registrar in respect to
registering, transferring, disabling, or cancelling a domain name if it is
done in the “implementation of a reasonable policy” (including the
UDRP) that prohibits registration of a domain name “identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another’s mark.” Second, the
ACPA authorizes a suit by a domain name registrant whose domain
name has been suspended, disabled, or transferred under that reasonable
policy (including the UDRP) to seek a declaration that the registrant’s
registration and use of the domain name involves no violation of the
Lanham Act as well as an injunction returning the domain name.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(ii)(II) (2000)) (internal citation omitted).
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interpreting ACPA cases may recognize the UDRP in a limited capacity,
the UDRP does play a valuable role in resolving domain name disputes.
4.

UDRP169

The UDRP plays a unique role, in addition to the existing legal
remedies granted by the FTDA and the ACPA, in privatized dispute
resolution.170 The system has garnered praise for its contribution to
domain name dispute resolution and also for its speed and efficiency.171
However, like the FTDA and the ACPA, the UDRP has its fair share of
criticism beginning with its narrow scope.172 For example, the UDRP
covers only a limited category of domain name disputes.173 Further, the
UDRP applies differently to different parties involved in domain name
disputes.174
In addition to the UDRP’s narrow scope, UDRP decisions have been
rendered virtually null and void.175 The proverbial deathblow of the
UDRP came in Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA.176 The First
Circuit in Sallen effectively ruled that the ACPA trumps any UDRP
decision.177 This holding undermined the function and purpose of
See supra Part II.F.4 (detailing the implementation of the UDRP).
See Carlton, supra note 39, at 33–34 (reasoning that the ICANN established procedures
allow owners to protect their marks and to reduce the need for defensive domain name
registrations).
171
See Helfer, supra note 136, at 494 (opining that the UDRP is a cost-effective and speedy
method to address domain name disputes, but that in no fashion did the UDRP supplant
cybersquatting litigation).
172
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104
(WIPO Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1104.html (ruling that the UDRP is narrow in scope and is not designed
to be a general remedy for all domain name misconduct).
173
See Ware, supra note 131, at 146 (expositing that the UDRP only covers claims that the
registrant’s domain name infringes on a trademark or servicemark). The UDRP applies
only to registrars in the .com, .net, and .org top-level domains. ICANN Policy, supra note
127, ¶ 1.
174
See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751 (E.D. Va. 2001). Participation in
UDRP proceedings is mandatory for domain name registrants, but optional for trademark
owners. Id. Trademark owners are not bound by contracts with domain name registrars;
thus, they may choose to take their trademark claims directly to court. Id.
175
See Cnty. Bookshops Ltd. v. Guy Loveday, WIPO Case No. D2000-0655, at 4 (WIPO
Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-0655.html. UDRP decisions are not binding. Id. A losing domain name registrant
can block implementation of a cancellation or transfer order by filing a law suit following
the decision, and a losing trademark owner can exhume its claim by filing suit or merely by
filing a second UDRP complaint. Id.
176
273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
177
Id. at 18 (“Section 1114(2)(D)(v) grants domain name registrants who have lost domain
names under administrative panel decisions applying the UDRP an affirmative cause of
169
170
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ICANN’s UDRP, removed any urgency to reform the shortcomings of
the current UDRP proceedings, caused federal courts to lose a valuable
alternative resource, and turned the domain name dispute resolution
process into a burden on domain name registrants.178 This line of judicial
reasoning has been extended, further weakening the UDRP’s
legitimacy.179
Legal scholars hypothesize that part of the reason that courts have
chosen to give less deference to UDRP decisions is either that panels
have stretched the role of the UDRP beyond its initial scope, or that they
have simply acted incorrectly.180 Ultimately, ICANN’s major objective of
eliminating both multiple jurisdictions and laws that decide domain
name disputes is circumvented when the ACPA overrides UDRP panel
decisions.181
Besides the effective undermining of the UDRP by the ACPA,
another major criticism of the UDRP is that there are no uniform rules in
place for arbitration panels to follow during their decision-making.182
The very language of ICANN’s Rules for the UDRP grants panel
members great discretion to use “any rules and principles of law it
deems applicable.”183 In early cases a lack of uniform rules may not have
been a major problem; however, with the increase in the volume, speed,
and intellect of modern cybersquatters, the UDRP has become

action in federal court for a declaration of nonviolation of the ACPA and for the return of
the wrongfully transferred domain names.”); see also McLaughlin, supra note 128, at 4−5
(commenting that the overlap between the ACPA and the UDRP could limit the
effectiveness of the UDRP in cases that the dispute appears to allow for some federal
cybersquatting action).
178
See Rohrer, supra note 26, at 564 (identifying that because federal courts give no
deference to UDRP proceedings, they may lose a useful resource in resolving domain name
disputes and the process could become a burden for domain name registrants).
179
See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
625–26 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling that any UDRP panel decision receives no deference under
the ACPA).
180
See Stewart, supra note 96, at 515 (commenting that the creative decision-making
employed in some UDRP cases is improper because the process relies on standard
procedures to achieve fast and inexpensive results).
181
See Rohrer, supra note 26, at 584–85 (noting that a party to a UDRP proceeding can
ignore the administrative decision and head to court where an entire new body of laws will
govern the case).
182
See generally Jo Saxe Levy, Precedent and Other Problems with ICANN’s UDRP Procedure,
CYBERSPACE LAW., Apr. 2001, at 20. UDRP Rule 15(a) provides little guidance in that “the
Panel shall decide the matter ‘in accordance with this Policy, these Rules and any rules and
principles of law that it deems applicable.’” Id. (quoting ICANN Rules, supra note 96, at
15(a)). Such open-ended rules grant each panel great discretion in making decisions. Id.
183
ICANN Rules, supra note 96, at 15(a).
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ineffective.184 ICANN’s original framers of the UDRP never anticipated
the advanced contemporary forms of cybersquatting, much less the
introduction of new TLDs.185 In addition to the expansive rules under
the UDRP, the cost of filing a UDRP action can range from two hundred
to two thousand times greater than the cost of registering a .com domain
name, thus allowing cybersquatters to register millions of violating
domain names.186
Currently, ICANN has no official policy in place to deter, prevent, or
address abusive domain name registrations.187 However, in the planning
stages of the new gTLD policy, ICANN commenced a process to
evaluate the concerns of trademark holders by seeking comments for
improving the mechanisms used to limit the unauthorized use of
trademarks in domain names.188 Fortunately, following the trademark
owners’ comments, ICANN focused intensely on this issue in regard to
the development of the new gTLD policy, and proactively proposed a
number of its own recommendations.189 These recommendations sought
to address possible problems that may arise in applying traditional
trademark law concepts to Internet governance.190
B. ICANN’s New gTLD Policy and Accompanying Proposed Proactive
Measures
ICANN’s new gTLD policy has been applauded as an avenue to
bring new services to consumers and to mitigate the market power of the
.com gTLD.191 ICANN’s IRT formulated five proposed solutions to
accompany the new policy lifting restrictions on gTLDs, specifically to
address potential problems like cybersquatting.192 First, ICANN plans to
184
See Rodenbaugh, supra note 53, at 184 (explaining that the current UDRP has been
rendered ineffective with the increasing sophistication of trademark cybersquatters).
185
Id. (stating that the UDRP was not designed to deal with phishers and drive-by
downloaders and is even less equipped to handle any new TLDs).
186
See id. at 179 (highlighting a recent report by MarkMonitor that discovered 380,000
cybersquatted domains that were related to just thirty brands).
187
Id. at 184.
188
Carlton, supra note 39, at 23 (developing this process was a direct attempt to prevent
non-trademark holders from obtaining domain names of rightful trademark owners).
189
See Farley, supra note 51, at 627 (indicating that ICANN’s Final Draft Proposal
contained twenty recommendations to curtail long-term domain name registration
problems).
190
Id.
191
Carlton, supra note 39, at 10 (explaining that ICANN’s new gTLD plan will likely
benefit consumers by offering new services and increasing innovation while at the same
time mitigating the market power associated with the .com TLD).
192
See Draft Final Report—Introduction of the GNSO New Generic Top-Level Domains,
ICANN (Mar. 16, 2007), http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-draft-fr.htm#recom; see
also Beckstrom, supra note 45 (recognizing that with the domain expansion there is a
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implement a new top-level, objection-based process to handle domain
name dispute resolution.193 This proposed objection-based process will
conduct an initial evaluation of both the merits of the applicants and
their disputed domain names.194 During the name portion of the initial
evaluation the IRT has proposed that during the name portion of the
initial evaluation an algorithm should be used to determine which
names require further analysis.195 Legal scholars criticize this proposed
solution for its potentially unscientific grounds for objecting to domain
names.
Further, scholars claim that this solution illustrates the
disconnect between trademark law and domain name registration
policy.196
possibility that some concerns and problems may arise). In order to ensure a smooth
transition, ICANN opened dialogues with various Internet stakeholders for
recommendations on how to handle the new TLDs. Id. These open dialogues have mainly
addressed intellectual property rights. ICANN, in collaboration with intellectual property
scholars, has begun to formulate solutions to any potential problems. Id.
193
See ICANN FAQs, supra note 38, at 3.15. This objection based process would allow
rights holders to assert that proposed gTLD domain names would infringe their legal
rights based on generally accepted and internationally recognized principles of law. Id.
This process would take into account that it is not unusual to have a trademark in the same
word or phrase for different products or services registered in different jurisdictions. Id.;
see also Carlton, supra note 39, at 7. The objection process to new gTLD applications would
include existing TLD registries, other applicants, holders of intellectual property rights and
others. Carlton, supra note 39, at 7. However, these objections can be filed on a limited
number of grounds including string confusion, trademark infringement, morality, public
order, and community objection. Id.
194
See Draft Applicant Guidebook, supra note 51, at 2-1 to 2-11. The Initial Evaluation will
assess domain names for their string similarity, if they are an already reserved name, if
they affect the stability of the DNS, and if they impose on established geographic domain
names. Id. Applicants will be judged upon their ability to demonstrate adequate technical
and operational capacity, sufficient finances, and an implemented registry service review
process for any DNS issues that may arise. Id. at 2-2, 2-14 to 2-18. Applicants who do not
pass all Initial Evaluation criteria will be subject to an Extended Evaluation. Id. at 2-18.
The Extended Evaluation maintains the same criteria as the Initial Evaluation but allows
applicants to remedy any initial shortcomings in their Initial Evaluation. Id.
195
See IRT Letter, supra note 138, at 46 (specifying that the IRT recommends that the
algorithm should only be used to determine possibly infringing domain names that would
then require further analysis).
196
Farley, supra note 51, at 631. Professor Farley exposits that
[t]rademark law is territorial in nature, therefore legal standards reflect
the consumer perspectives of the particular state. . . . Trademark
content restrictions are similar in approach. For instance, under U.S.
trademark law, a mark will be refused registration if it is deemed to be
scandalous or immoral when considered from the perspective of “a
substantial composite of the general public.”
The “public” is
understood to mean the U.S. public. To extend this legal standard to
domain names it is necessary to consider a substantial composite of the
general public of the entire world, not just the United States. This is
obviously an unworkable standard. Even if it were a workable
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The ICANN IRT’s second major proposal is to create an Intellectual
Property Clearinghouse in concert with a Globally Protected Marks List
(“GPML”).197 This proposed solution calls for the IP Clearinghouse to
act: (1) as the neutral central body with which all new gTLD registries,
and possibly registrars, interact in relation to the GPML; and (2) also as a
central information and database performing specific information
collection and data validation.198 The IP Clearinghouse would employ
the GPML as a tool to prevent third parties from registering TLDs that
match or are confusingly similar to trademarks on the list as well as
second-level domains that match trademarks on the list.199 Similar to
other previously mentioned proposed measures, this proposed solution
has been bombarded because of the incongruence between the domain
name registration process and traditional trademark law.200
The third major proposal of the IRT is the implementation of the
Uniform Rapid Suspension (“URS”) for cases in which there is no
genuine contestable issue as to the blatant and obvious domain name
abuse that is taking place.201 The IRT recognized that since the inception
of the UDRP, circumstances and technology have changed, and as such,
standard, it results in the lowest common denominator analysis much
like obscenity analysis over the Internet.
Thus, for example,
.democracy, .gayrights, and .jesus, may all be refused as being morally
offensive to the least tolerant society.
Id. (citations omitted).
197
See IRT Letter, supra note 138, at 5 (outlining the IRT’s draft recommendation for the
IP Clearinghouse, the Globally Protected Marks List and associated Rights Protection
Mechanisms (“RPMs”), and standardized pre-launch rights protection mechanisms).
198
Id. at 13.
199
See id. at 15 (“A Globally Protected Marks List of trademarks satisfying the strict
requirements recommended herein that has the effect of limiting third-party applications
for (a) top-level domains that match or are confusingly similar to trademarks on the list;
and (b) second-level domains that match trademarks on the list . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
200
Farley, supra note 51, at 628. Professor Farley states the following:
This policy proposes comparing existing second level domains
with proposed dot generics. Consider www.amazon.com versus an
application for .amazon, where .amazon might be a top-level domain
dedicated to the study of all things having to do with the Amazon.
These two applications are certainly confusingly similar. They are
identical words, therefore they would fail the test provided by this
ICANN proposal. . . .
A related problem with this recommendation is that it equates
domain names with trademarks as legally protectable properties. They
are not. Trademarks are legally protected intellectual property
because the commercial use of a mark by another that is likely to cause
confusion would injure consumers.
Id.
201
See IRT Letter, supra note 138, at 25 (clarifying that the URS will not be used to address
cases of alleged infringement, for anti-competition purposes, or to prevent free speech).
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trademark holders and Internet users face more domain name abuse and
infringement daily.202 The URS would supplement the UDRP by
providing a faster means to stop the operation of an abusive Internet
domain in a separate proceeding.203 The URS would provide a cheaper
and faster means for removing infringing domain name registrations,
while allowing the possibility for appeal by the registrant.204 Presently,
there is little scholarly analysis of this proposed solution, but judging
from the criticism addressing the UDRP, any change would be
welcome.205
The IRT’s fourth proposed solution calls for a Post-Delegation
Dispute Mechanism to inhibit any registry misconduct.206 The PostDelegation Dispute Mechanism would allow a trademark holder to
initiate a post-domain name delegation dispute by submitting a
complaint to ICANN.207 Following ICANN’s investigation, the PostDelegation Dispute Mechanism could enforce sanctions, suspensions, or
find group liability that would warrant the cancellation of the registry’s
or registrar’s agreement with ICANN.208 Similar to the other proposed

202
See id. at 25–26. The IRT suggested that “times and circumstances have changed since
the UDRP was implemented and brand owners and Internet users find themselves facing
unprecedented levels of abuse and infringement, which undermines trust in, and thereby
negatively impacts the stability and security of the Internet.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he
purpose of the URS is to address a cybersquatting problem for brand owners that is already
insidious and enormous in scale, and which will continue to spiral out of control with the
introduction of an unlimited number of new gTLDs unless addressed.” Id.
203
Id. at 25. The URS proceeding would only supplement the UDRP and not supplant it.
Id. When any genuine contestable issue as to whether a domain name is an abusive use of
a trademark, the complaint would not be heard in a URS proceeding but in a UDRP or
court proceeding. Id.
204
Id. at 26.
205
See supra Part III.A.4 (recognizing that some legal scholars have documented their
displeasure with the current domain name dispute resolution model).
206
See IRT Letter, supra note 138, at 39. The Post-Delegation Dispute Mechanism was
designed to combat the following:
(i) Registry Operators that operate a TLD in a manner that is
inconsistent with the representations and warranties contained within
its Registry Agreement, or (ii) Registry Operations that have a bad
faith intent to profit from the systematic registration of infringing
domain names (or systematic cybersquatting) in the Registry
Operator’s TLD.
Id.
207
See id. at 40 (noting that following the submission of the complaint and a refundable
deposit ICANN must investigate whether the Registry Operator is in material breach of its
contractual obligations).
208
Id. at 25. The IRT proposes that the following enforcement tools be available:
2.4.1
Sanctions
&
Suspension—Providing
for
escalated
compliance enforcement tools such as monetary sanctions
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solutions, the Post-Delegation Dispute Mechanism would supplement
the UDRP, not supplant it; and if either ICANN or the Registry Operator
chose to have a UDRP proceeding, or a court action in the appropriate
jurisdiction, it would be permitted.209
The fifth and final major proposed solution by the IRT calls for all
new TLDs to provide WHOIS under the “Thick” or Registry level
WHOIS Model.210 The WHOIS database is a central publicly accessible
list that contains all of the domain name registration information
submitted by domain name registrars.211 The IRT believes the “Thick”
WHOIS Model is essential to the cost-effective protection of consumers
and intellectual property owners.212 The IRT bases its decision on the
fact that for many years newer gTLDs such as .biz and .info have
employed a “Thick” Registry WHOIS model without any evidence of

2.4.2

2.4.3

the suspension of accepting new domain name registrations
in the TLD until such time as the violation(s) . . . is cured.
Group Liability—Preventing “serial misconduct” by
registries when another affiliated (by common control)
registry’s or registrar’s agreement with ICANN is
terminated, provided that such affiliated registry or registrar
has also been involved in the [violating] activities . . . .
Termination of Contract—Providing for the termination of a
registry agreement should a Registry Operator be found by
three (3) separate Panels, arising out of 3 separate and
distinct incidents, to have violated its contract . . . within any
eighteen (18)-month period.

Id at 43.
Id. at 44. The system is set up so that
[t]he mandatory administrative proceeding requirements . . . shall not
prevent Registry Operator or ICANN from submitting the dispute to
an administrative panel in accordance with its applicable Registry
Agreement or to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent
resolution before such mandatory Post-Delegation Dispute proceeding
is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.
Id.
210
See Froomkin, supra note 27, at 99 n.356 (explaining WHOIS). The preferred Thick
WHOIS model would be “the central, registry-level provision of WHOIS information for all
domain names registered within the registry. This model is in contrast to the ‘Thin
WHOIS’ model whereby the registry-level information is very limited and Internet users
must rely on the registrar-level for the submission of robust WHOIS data.” IRT Letter,
supra note 138, at 45.
211
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the
registration of a domain name requires one to submit the applicant’s name, telephone
number, postal address, and e-mail address, and further noting that this information is
known as the WHOIS information according to the ICANN Agreement and that it must be
publicly accessible and updated daily by the registrars).
212
IRT Letter, supra note 138, at 45.
209
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legal repercussions.213 Adopting such a policy would allow Internet
users and domain name registrants to monitor all the names that are
registered in their registry including those that may be infringing upon
their trademark.214
Surveying the current landscape of domain name dispute resolution,
both through governmental legislation and private arbitration, it is clear
that some sort of change is in order.215 Although ICANN is far from a
perfect manager of the domain name registration system, it is extremely
successful in separating the technical operations of the Internet from
Furthermore,
throughout
the
overreaching
governments.216
implementation of the new gTLD policy, ICANN has remained open to
enacting additional mechanisms to protect against potential abuse of
existing trademarks, which demonstrates ICANN’s ultimate goal of
minimizing domain name abuse.217 Unfortunately, ICANN’s five
proposed solutions to accompany the new policy lifting the restrictions
on gTLDs are idealistic and lack the legal power to be enough to protect
legitimate trademark holders and domain name registrants.218 ICANN
acts as little more than a gatekeeper to those who wish to register
domain names. Further, any decision that a UDRP panel hands down
213
Id. The IRT recognizes that some comments raised in the public comment session
raised privacy concerns about this recommendation. Id. at 45 n.50. However, it notes that
the Thick registry WHOIS model has been used in many new gTLDs without any adverse
legal consequences. Id.
214
See Harris, supra note 127, at 48. The authors explain that the
WHOIS databases provide a crucial tool for businesses, the Federal
Trade Commission, and other law enforcement agencies to track down
brand infringement, online fraud, identity theft, and other online
illegal activity, but are often hindered in their pursuit because the
person responsible is hiding behind the anonymity of false registration
information.
Id. (quoting S. Res. 564, 110th Cong. § 2(15) (as introduced Feb. 25, 2008)).
215
See supra Part III.A (documenting the successes and shortcomings of the current
remedial measures for domain name disputes).
216
See DelBianco & Cox, supra note 77, at 39 (noting that ICANN’s thorough and
continued management of the technical functions of the Internet is the best way to maintain
its independence and democracy and at the same time fend off interfering governments).
217
See Carlton, supra note 39, at 33. If ICANN deems it necessary
various additional mechanisms could be created by ICANN to protect
against abuse of existing trademarks. The draconian remedy of
precluding entry a as [sic] means of preventing the possibility of a
need for defensive registrations is unlikely to be an efficient
mechanism for dealing with these costs because it deprives consumers
of the benefits of entry.
Id.
218
See Cnty. Bookshops Ltd. v. Guy Loveday, WIPO Case No. D2000-0655, at 4 (WIPO
Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-0655.html (recognizing that UDRP decisions are not binding on federal courts).
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can be abrogated by a federal court proceeding.219 The lack of a final say
in domain name disputes makes any ICANN remedial measure a truly
hollow solution. Reviewing the current landscape, there is no doubt that
the likelihood of confusion test is beneficial in limited circumstances as is
the ACPA. However, there remains a huge hole that can be filled by a
likelihood of dilution test. The task at hand now is to determine which
proposed solutions to integrate to ensure a smooth and efficient
transition into a more expansive TLD name system.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Lifting restrictions and allowing the open registration of new gTLDs
will flood both federal courts and UDRP proceedings with an increased
Ideally, a new federal
caseload of domain name disputes.220
cybersquatting law designed specifically to address these potentially
new domain name disputes would be the best solution. Unfortunately,
the time that it would take Congress to conduct congressional hearings,
engage committees, and then approve any legislation, makes new
legislation an impractical solution with the domain registration
restrictions having been lifted in 2010. Consequently, any effective
solution must incorporate the currently established and utilized remedial
measures.221
The common thread among the currently established remedial
measures is the fact that both trademark and legitimate domain name
registrants bear the responsibility of monitoring the market for any
infringement.222 Convoluting the situation, ICANN’s lifting of TLD
name registration restrictions will likely lead to some cybersquatting or
damage to those famous domain names and trademarks.223 However, a
solution does exist that would not only give legitimate domain name
owners redress but also clarify some current uncertainty in trademark
law.
219
See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
625–26 (4th Cir. 2003) (reiterating that federal courts give no deference to UDRP panel
decisions).
220
See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (noting that a number of possible
trademark issues exist and that many influential American corporations have expressed
concerns with possible increased domain name litigation).
221
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the currently available remedial measures: the FTDA,
TDRA, ACPA, and UDRP).
222
Whether a plaintiff chooses to use the FTDA, TDRA, ACPA, or UDRP the burden of
monitoring the market for infringing uses on a rightful owner’s trademark falls on that
owner.
223
See supra Part II.D (recognizing the potential problems that could accompany the
expansion of top-level domain name registrations).
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The TDRA and a Likelihood of

Implementing an articulated likelihood of dilution test that would be
used by courts to accompany the TDRA would protect both domain
name registrants from cybersquatters and also trademark owners from
infringing use of their respective marks. The TDRA provides the best
solution for a number of reasons. First, the TDRA provides an intact,
fast, and furious remedy to litigate both domain name abuses and
trademark dilution.224 Second, common domain name abuses fall within
the realm of dilution protected under the TDRA.225 Third, the TDRA is
recent legislation that is still open for judicial interpretation using the
new likelihood of dilution standard.226 Fourth, by simply adding an
articulated likelihood of dilution test, federal courts would have a
uniform standard to use in reviewing claims of trademark dilution and
domain name abuses. Fifth, domain name registrants and trademark
holders would have a clear indication of what constitutes infringing use,
thus limiting the number of frivolous claims. These five reasons
demonstrate that implementing a likelihood of dilution test would
benefit legitimate domain name holders, trademark holders, federal
courts, and trademark law in general.
B. The Likelihood of Dilution Test
Initially, it is important to note that this proposed likelihood of
dilution test would be distinct and insular from the currently employed
test that governs FTDA analysis. The proposed test would only amend
the test for “dilution by blurring,” which in no way affects the separate
“dilution by tarnishment” test or any trademark infringement based on
the “likelihood of confusion analysis.” That being said, to implement the
most effective and impactful test, three carefully selected factors have
been compiled: the similarity of the marks, the relatedness of the goods
or services, and the contemporaneous use of the Internet as a marketing
channel. Unlike most trademark tests that weigh the totality of the
circumstances or act as a balancing test, the proposed test navigates a
step by step procedure in which dilution by blurring can be found at any
See supra Part II.F.2 (detailing the intricacies of the TDRA).
See Roe, supra note 112, at 602 (recognizing that courts may find a use to be close
enough to constitute “identical” under the TDRA to find dilution, even though the use of
domain names was not precisely identical).
226
See id. at 589 (claiming that the open-ended likelihood of dilution standard allows for
judicial interpretation); Kuhn, supra note 111, at 9 (stating that federal courts have yet to set
concrete standards to determine dilution under the TDRA).
224
225

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/3

Borchert: Imminent Domain Name: The Technological Land-Grab and ICANN's Lif

2011]

ICANN and the Technological Land-Grab

547

step without requiring further analysis of the remaining factors. The
first and primary factor in determining dilution should be the similarity
of the marks.227 Infringing marks that are remarkably similar to famous
and legitimate trademarks would generate a presumption of dilution
under the proposed test. Marks that are identical or nearly identical
would need no further factor analysis beyond the first factor because
dilution would already exist.228
The same analysis would apply to domain name abuses. An
example would be illustrative. Imagine if a cybersquatter were to
acquire the .ford TLD name following ICANN’s lifting of gTLD
restrictions and the Ford Motor Company brought suit under the TDRA.
Following the proposed likelihood of dilution test and its primary factor,
the similarity of the marks, the cybersquatter would be diluting Ford’s
legitimate trademark.229 Clearly, implementing similarity of the marks
as the first factor would catch many egregious and obvious
infringements and abuses without requiring further analysis.230
Nonetheless, to augment the likelihood of dilution test in a case
where the similarity of the marks is ruled inconsequential, the second
factor would be the relatedness of the goods or services. Marks or
domain names that may have passing similarities may not be fatal in
similarity, but if they are competitors in business, dilution may be found.
Implementing this as the second factor would have found dilution by
both blurring and tarnishment in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.231
Although the Supreme Court found dilution by tarnishment, they did
not find dilution by blurring.232 Under the relatedness of goods or
services factor of the proposed likelihood of dilution test, dilution by
blurring would be found. Both companies were in the business of selling
women’s lingerie and other novelty items.233 In such a case, dilution
227
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (holding that “direct
evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can
reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the
junior and senior marks are identical”).
228
Id.
229
See Simburg et al., supra note 112, at 387. The TDRA provides greater certainty in
determining when dilution has occurred by defining blurring as the “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.” Id. (citation omitted).
230
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434 (reasoning that dilution can be proven easily in the cases
where the true mark and the infringing mark are identical).
231
Id.
232
Id.; see also Kuhn, supra note 111, at 21 (relaying that the court found dilution by
tarnishment but not by blurring, thus leaving the question of how one proves a likelihood
of dilution unanswered).
233
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423 (noting that besides lingerie, the store sold romantic lighting,
lycra dresses, adult novelty items, and pagers).
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would likely be found because a legitimate trademark was being
infringed upon by a direct competitor in business.
The third and least weighted factor of the proposed likelihood of
dilution test is the contemporaneous use of the Internet as a marketing
channel. TDRA cases that do not find dilution by the first two factors of
the proposed test would then look to the contemporaneous use of the
Internet as a marketing tool. Courts would look to where the competing
marks advertise and market their respective businesses. For example, if
two companies with somewhat similar marks compete in related or
similar goods or services, but market on different Internet sites, it is
possible that dilution may not be found. Conversely, if two companies
with somewhat similar marks compete in related or similar goods or
services, and then one company begins to encroach and advertise on all
the same sites as another, dilution may be found.
Overall, the framework of the proposed likelihood of dilution test
may not appear to be concrete. However, given the sophistication of
federal courts, a uniform factored test would heed consistent rulings.
That being the case, both legitimate trademark holders and domain
name registrants would benefit because there would be a more
indicative body of case law as to what constitutes a likelihood of
dilution. Critics may argue that such a proposed test is only a solution
for marks that are already in existence. Nonetheless, trademark holders
and domain name registrants would have a clearer idea of when their
trademarks or domain names were being violated. Ultimately, this
federal claim provides a more powerful and far reaching course of action
for trademark holders and domain name registrants than any other
remedy currently in existence.
V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the introduction to this Note, history has a way of
repeating itself. Although the Homestead Act of 1862 proved to be an
unsuccessful attempt at physical expansion, ICANN and federal courts
can learn something in their technological land-grab. Under the already
implemented TDRA, federal courts can adopt a simple, three-factor
likelihood of dilution test that can solve both trademark issues and
domain name disputes.
This Note proposes a likelihood of dilution test under the TDRA that
can apply both to trademark law issues and domain name disputes.
Critics may question the efficacy of a simple three-factor test. However,
if federal courts simply employ the suggested likelihood of dilution test,
their courtrooms will run more efficiently, trademark and domain name
owners will recognize dilution and abuses with more ease, and
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trademark law as a whole will gain some needed clarity. Successful
implementation of the new gTLD registration policy will spur
innovation, creativity, and business expansion in cyberspace. On the
other hand, failure to implement a new policy will lead to a flood of
lawsuits, trademark violations, and finger pointing. With the proposed
likelihood of dilution test under the TDRA, federal courts can avoid a
mountain of problems that would result if the gTLD expansion occurred
today.
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